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I. INTRODUCTION
[A]lmost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost
all of their obligations almost all of the time.'
There is more than a kernel of truth in this quip about the problem of state
compliance with international obligations. Without strong monitoring and
compliance mechanisms, states are tempted to embrace international solutions
and then not follow through with their obligations.' Despite such shortcom-
ings, multilateral agreements on issues as diverse as environment, peace, trade,
and international debt have given rise to international regimes.3 Nowhere is
this clearer than in the environmental context where recent events, such as the
Soviet nuclear disaster at Chernobyl and the burning of Kuwaiti oil fields,
remind us that pollution recognizes no borders.
This article focuses on a quintessentially global environmental issue, the
depletion of the ozone layer, and on the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol), an agreement adopted in 1987
and significantly strengthened in 1990 under the auspices of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP). 4 Sixty-three countries have ratified the
1. L. HENKiN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (1979), quoted in R.
KEoHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLmCAL ECONOMY 98
(1984).
2. This can occur if penalties for noncompliance are weak and internationalization of the obligation
successfully deflects attention away from political inaction at home. There are few political costs in issuing
broad policy statements pledging cooperative action or in allowing other states to act and then reaping the
subsequent benefits. Economists refer to this as the "free rider" problem. See Axelrod, An Evolutionary
Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. Sm. REV. 1095, 1103 (1986).
3. Regime theorists describe regimes as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."
See Haggard & Simmons, heories ofInternational Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 3,493 (1987). Another regime
theorist, Donnelly, argues that this definition is overbroad and is therefore meaningless. He suggests a more
limited definition, which defines regimes as "norms and decision-making procedures accepted by interna-
tional actors to regulate an issue area." See Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis,
40 INT'L ORG. 599, 602 (1987), quoting Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and InternationalRegimes,
32 WORLD POL. 357, 358 (1980).
4. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541,
1544 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. For the 1990 London Amendments, see Report of the Second Meeting
of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment
Programme, U.N. Doc. EP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (1990) [hereinafter London Amendments]. See also Parties to
Montreal ProtocolAgree to Phase Out CFCs, Help Developing Nations, 13 Int'l Env't Current Rep. (BNA)
No.7, at 275 (July 11, 1990). For a description of the evolution of the agreement, see Tolba, The Ozone
Agreement - and Beyond, 14 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 287 (1987); see also Doniger, Politics of the Ozone
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agreement, representing over 99 % of the production and 90 % of the consump-
tion of ozone-depleting chemicals.5 As the first global agreement adopted to
protect the earth's atmosphere, the Montreal Protocol is perhaps the greatest
achievement of the UNEP regime.6 The Protocol not only addresses a serious
global environmental crisis, it sets the stage for collective action on global
warming.7 In February 1991, 130 countries began meeting to negotiate a
treaty on global warming, a process to which the Montreal Protocol undoubted-
ly will contribute.8
Yet depletion of the ozone layer continues and the work of putting the
Montreal Protocol into effect has just begun. Many of the real challenges lie
ahead, including adoption of an effective noncompliance provision that will
encourage countries to abide by their commitments. The parties to the Protocol
are expected to meet in 1992 to discuss proposals for a noncompliance provi-
sion. This article suggests ways to build a successful monitoring and compli-
ance regime drawing on effective features of other regimes. Part I describes
the development of the Montreal Protocol and the forces that led to its adop-
tion. Part II describes the Protocol and the recent amendments strengthening
it. Part III considers useful theoretical work in regime theory, and evaluates
enforcement mechanisms of various regimes for inclusion in the nascent
noncompliance regime of the Protocol. Part IV concludes by arguing that the
Protocol regime must incorporate a stronger monitoring and compliance
mechanism than the one currently in place -- one that allows for a more formal
role for public interest nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)9 - if the
Layer, 4 ISSUES IN ScI. & TECH. 86 (1988).
5. As of August 2, 1990, 63 countries had ratified the Montreal Protocol. There are a number of
important countries, such as India and China, that are expected to ratify now that a fund has been included
to help developing countries make the transition to safer chemicals and products. See R. BENEDICK, OZONE
DILOMACY app. C, at 265 (1991).
6. UNEP was established at the Stockholm Conference of 1972, the first major international
conference on the state of the global environment. The formation of UNEP accelerated the development
of the international environmental regime. UNEP codified customary law through statements of environmen-
tal principles, facilitatedjoint research and education programs, and brought countries together to negotiate
treaties. For a thorough discussion of UNEP's history, see Gray, The United Nations Environment
Programme: An Assessment, 20 ENVrL. L. 291 (1990).
7. It has never been seriously contended that there would not be significant health and environmental
effects from ozone layer depletion. Recent data indicate that ozone depletion is occurring far more rapidly
than previously believed and that ultraviolet rays are reaching the ground for more significant periods of
the year. The data measured 4% to 8% reductions in the ozone layer, which is a dramatic increase from
the 3% decrease measured in 1986. See infra note 46. Every increase of 1% translates into a 5% to 7%
increase in cases of skin cancer, doubling the projected mortality from 5,000 to 10,000 people each year.
Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1991, at Al, col. 1. Additionally, infrared exposure is known to cause widespread
damage to crops and to phytoplankton, the microorganisms upon which fisheries depend for food. Ozone-
depleting chemicals also act as heat trapping gases, and may contribute up to 25% of the global warming
gases. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 21.
8. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1991, at A17, col. 1. See also U.S. to Host First Session in February for
Negotiating International Convention, 13 Int'l Envtl Current Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 414 (Oct. 10, 1990).
9. Public interest nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) refer to nonprofit organizations that work
on behalf of the environment and the public at large. Organizations especially involved in the ozone layer
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regime is to. be effective in accomplishing its imperative task of phasing out
ozone-depleting chemicals.' °
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
Almost two decades have passed since a seminal article appearing in Nature
magazine first alerted the world to the possibility of ozone layer depletion by
man-made chemicals. 1 At the time, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the predom-
inant ozone-depleting chemicals, were in widespread use.' Despite the urgen-
cy of the problem, international action was stymied by disagreements over the
danger posed by these chemicals, the degree of action necessary to curtail their
use, and the shape an international agreement should take.13 When negotia-
tions over a treaty to limit CFCs finally began, the dramatically different
attitudes toward the politics, economics, and environmental benefits of an
ozone layer agreement pitted the United States against those European coun-
tries that had significant economic interests in producing CFCs. In many ways,
the entrance of the developing countries, eager to avoid becoming the recipi-
ents of the North's discarded chemicals and technologies, helped rescue the
debate from regional parochialism and focused the parties on a constructive,
debate are the Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC), and World Resources Institute. They work to protect the environment and interests of
people who would otherwise have little voice in national and international political channels. Financial
support is provided through membership fees, foundations, special gifts, and government grants.
10. At the national level, United States NGOs have been vital in shaping the akreement and in
mobilizing countries to be aggressive negotiators by working with Congress, state legislatures, the
regulatory process, lawsuits, and with industry. At the international level, these NGOs have acted as
observers and experts in the forums organized by UNEP. They were also crucial in encouraging their
counterparts in Europe and lesser developed countries to join the debate, albeit at a much later stage.
11. In the article, two scientists hypothesized that CFCs rise 10 to 50 kilometers above the earth and
cause a catalytic reaction that destroys ozone in the stratosphere. Because of their stable chemical structure,
CFCs can remain in the atmosphere for a period lasting from many decades to several centuries. The
scientists concluded that when they are eventually broken down, CFCs release large volumes of chlorine.
A chemical chain reaction begins in which chlorine atoms destroy ozone molecules, and ozone is trans-
formed into two-atom oxygen. The chlorine atom survives and is free to react with more ozone molecules.
Molina & Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atom Catalyzed Destruction
of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974).
12. The major ozone-depleting chemicals are chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). They are used as solvents
and in thousands of products including aerosol cans, refrigeration, air conditioning, transportation, plastics,
insulation, pharmaceuticals, computers, and electronics. Another family of ozone- depleting chemicals are
halons, which are used primarily in fire extinguishers. CFCs and halons have long been considered
"miracle' chemicals because they cause minimal direct human health risks, are not flammable or explosive,
and do not readily react with other chemical substances. However, it is precisely these properties that have
made these chemicals so destructive to the ozone layer. A molecule of chlorine can last in the atmosphere
for over one-hundred years and can destroy tens of thousands of molecules of ozone. Shea, Protecting ife
on Earth: Steps to Save the Ozone Layer, WORLDWATCH PAPER 87, at 20 (1988).
13. For example, at a workshop in Rome in 1986, European industry representatives refused to admit
that new controls were necessary in light of a recent upturn in the production of CFCs, choosing instead
to contest the validity of the scientific evidence. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 47-48.
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global solution. 4 As a result, the developed countries, which have been
primarily responsible for the dramatic loss in ozone, will not only reduce their
reliance on ozone-depleting chemicals but also will help developing countries,
through a multilateral fund and the transfer of technology, choose a more
environmentally sound path.'" Accomplishing major global reductions in the
release of these chemicals will take another ten years, a daunting prospect
when one considers that it will take decades, or even centuries, to reverse the
amount of ozone-depleting chlorine already in the atmosphere.
A. Setting the Stage for a Multilateral Agreement
The Governing Council of UNEP led the development of an international
treaty. It established the Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer in 1977,
and urged support for a World Plan of Action to protect the ozone layer.16
By 1981, the committee of scientific experts issued an executive summary of
the state of the ozone layer and the scientific knowledge that formed the basis
for its assessment. 17 After the assessment was issued, treaty drafting and
negotiations began in earnest. The UNEP Governing Council formed the Ad
Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts (Working Group) to
develop a framework convention to which control protocols could be added,
and to garner support for action from a broad group of states, international
bodies, and organizations.'"
14. Virtually all sales of CFCs between 1931 and 1986 were to customers in developed countries.
However, markets for products made with CFCs have increased rapidly. For example, bulk chemical use
in developing countries totalled a significant 16% in 1986. Shea, supra note 12, at 20.
15. The data make it clear why global support for CFC reductions is necessary. In 1986, the United
States accounted for 30% of the world output of CFC-11 and CFC-12, the European Community (EC) for
43% to 45%, Japan for 11% to 12%, the USSR for 9% to 10%, and Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, India, Mexico, and Venezuela for the remaining 3% to 7%. Users of these chemicals are obviously
a far larger group, with the EC as the nearly exclusive supplier of CFCs to markets in developing countries.
The EC expanded its exports 43% between 1976 and 1985, which accounted for nearly one-third of its
production. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 26.
16. Towards an Ozone Convention: A Look at Some Issues, U.N. Environment Programme Secretari-
at, at 2, U.N. Doc. EP/WG.69/5 (1981).
17. Although the committee's conclusion urging action was important, the process the committee
initiated - gathering data that all members could agree on - was ultimately its most important function.
In the data itself were the seeds of future arguments that the treaty's controls should not be limited to
aerosol use of CFCs, to the predominant CFCs, CFC-11 and CFC-12, or to the United States and EC
countries. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a
Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Programme, at
1, U.N. Doc. EP/WG.78/8 (1983).
18. TheWorking Group included representatives ofgovernments, university scientists, and representa-
tives of intergovernmental organizations, such as the EC, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group
of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration ofa Global Framework Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer on its First Session, U.N. Environment Programme, at 2, U.N. Doc. EPIWG.69/10
(1982).
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UNEP launched the Working Group process in the midst of great scientific
uncertainty about the processes driving ozone depletion.19 UNEP maintained
the international effort despite lowered predictions of ozone depletion and a
new administration in the United States, under President Reagan, that accorded
a low priority to the issue.20 For three years, the Working Group met in
arduous sessions to revise the draft language of the convention and to debate
the merits of appending a control protocol to the framework convention. 21
Few NGOs or developing countries participated in the sessions, and the debate
became polarized between the European Community (EC) and those countries
that had taken some action to control CFCs.' Two industries in particular,
Britain's Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and France's Atochem, were
considered powerful enough to determine the international posture of the
EC.23
As the date for consideration of the convention approached, the United
States and Canada joined the Scandinavian countries in backing an international
aerosol ban. 4 Due to the continued intransigence of both the EC Council and
most of its member countries, however, the framework convention ultimately
failed to mandate reductions.'
19. As scientists developed models to take into account the natural and chemical processes influencing
ozone depletion, the predictions for rate of depletion over the next century varied enormously, from a high
of 19% in 1979 to a low of 3% in 1983. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 13.
20. Id. at 42. UNEP fostered general agreement on research into ozone depletion and its causes,
information exchange on policies and technologies, transfer of less harmful technologies to developing
countries, and monitoring of ozone-depleting chemicals and ozone depletion. Draft Convention for the
Protection ofthe OzoneLayer, With Commentary, U.N. EnvironmentProgramme, U.N. Doc. EP/WG.78/2
(1982).
21. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 42. See RevisedDraft Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, With Additional Commentary, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. EP/WG.78/10 (1983);
SecondRevisedDraft Conventionforthe Protection of the OzoneLayer, With Additional Commentary, U.N.
Environment Programme, at 3, U.N. Doc. EP/WG.94/3 (1983). For a description of protocol options,
see Alternative Structures and Formats for Technical Annexes and/or Protocols to the Draft Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Programme Secretariat, U.N. Doc. EPIWG.78/3
(1982).
22. The EC insisted on speaking with one voice despite growing dissention among its 12 member
states. It was dominated by CFC-producing industries and felt little pressure from environmentalists,
legislators or the European public to limit CFCs. The EC rejected both an aerosol ban proposed by West
Germany and its own Commission's recommendation for a 50% reduction in aerosols by 1983, supporting
instead the internationalizationofa capacity limit. The chief United States negotiator, Ambassador Richard
R. Benedick, called the EC proposal "disingenuous," because it would have no effect until the end of the
century. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 25.
23. Both companies represented their respective governments at a number of negotiating sessions.
id. at 33.
24. See Revised Draft Proposal Concerning Measures to Control, Limit and Reduce the Emissions
of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)forthe Protection ofthe OzoneLayer, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N.
Doc. EP/WG.94/9 (1983); Draft Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons: Revised Text Submitted by Canada,
Norway, Sweden and the United States of America, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Doc.
EP/WG.110/CRP.1 (1984).
25. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration
ofa Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Programme,
U.N. Doc. EP/IG.53/4 (1985).
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As the UNEP Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer was being
formed in 1977, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) -- acting together
with the Food and Drug Administration and Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission, and prompted by the threat of a lawsuit by the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) - banned CFC use in aerosols in the United States
under the Toxic Substances Control Act. 6 Similar actions followed shortly
thereafter in Canada, Norway, and Sweden.27 Later in 1977, Congress ap-
proved amendments to the Clean Air Act that included a precautionary provi-
sion directing the EPA to regulate any substances affecting the ozone layer and
endangering public health or welfare.28
Instead of meeting its arguably legal obligations to mandate further reduc-
tions at home, though, the EPA pursued the international forum provided by
UNEP. This enabled the United States to espouse a multilateral strategy that
environmentalists considered necessary, while placating domestic industry by
delaying the imposition of further controls.29 This policy suited United States
companies that were wary of more unilateral regulations and that needed time
to develop substitute substances as the world market shifted away from ozone-
depleting chemicals.3"
Meanwhile, national pressure increased and, as a result of a lawsuit
brought by the NRDC in 1984, a Washington, D.C. District Court ordered
the EPA to formulate domestic regulations under the Clean Air Act, or to
explain why it had not already done so, by early 1987."' In an effort to avoid
26. Final Rules, Toxic Substance Control Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1978). For a thorough discussion
of the history of EPA's regulation of CFCs, see Nangle, Stratospheric Ozone: United States Regulation
of Chlorofluorocarbons, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 531.
27. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 24. While the bans affected three billion dollars in sales, the CFC
aerosols were quickly replaced by more economical substitutes. Id. at 24, 31.
28. Under section 157(b) of the Clean Air Act, "the Administrator shall propose regulations for the
control of any substance, practice, process, or activity (or any combination thereof) which in his judgment
may reasonably be anticipated to affect the stratosphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere, if such effect
in the stratosphere may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. §
7457(b) (1988).
29. Moreover, the United States multilateral strategy was stymied in 1981 by the inauguration of
President Ronald Reagan, who was more responsive to industrial interests than to environmental concerns.
See generally J. LASH, A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE STORY OF THE REAGAN ADMINSTRATION'S ATTACK
ON THE ENVIRONMENT (1984). When William Ruckelshaus replaced Anne Burford as EPA Administrator
in 1983, mid-level EPA staffers convinced the new Administrator to support internationalization of the
United States aerosol ban, and to join the Toronto Group, several countries that supported CFC controls,
including Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 42.
30. United States CFC producers strongly opposed a 1980 EPA proposal to freeze non-aerosols and
remained opposed to an international agreement until 1986, when they conceded that its adoption was
inevitable and would boost their competitiveness in marketing substitutes with the EC companies, such as
the French Atochem and British Imperial Chemicals Industries, which were subject to no limitations. R.
BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 31-33. Du Pont, responsible for one quarter of the world's supply of CFCs,
announced in workshops held by EPA and UNEP in 1986 that it could manufacture substitutes within five
years, given policies that created the proper economic incentives. See Doniger, supra note 4, at 88.
31. NRDC v. Thomas, No. 84-3587, slip op. (D.D.C. May 17, 1986). See also NRDC Sues to
Require EPA to Issue Rules Limiting Emissions of Chlorofluorocarbons, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1384 (Dec.
14, 1984). For the regulations that stemmed from this order, see 40 C.F.R. § 82 (1987).
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further legal action aimed at compelling it to issue unilateral regulations, the
EPA launched its Stratospheric Ozone Protection Program, which initiated
domestic scientific and policy assessments, while organizing and cosponsoring
international workshops with UNEP.32 Based on the EPA's assessments, the
EPA and the State Department proposed that CFCs be phased out by the turn
of the century. Ultimately, however, members of the Reagan administration
weakened this position by unleashing their infamous "hats and sunglasses"
response to the State Department.33
Unilateral action during the 1970s and 1980s produced two major multilat-
eral benefits. 34 First, Canada, Scandinavia, and the United States (which on
its own used and produced over one-third of all CFCs) demonstrated the
technical and economic feasibility of banning CFC propellants in aerosols.
Second, the possibility of further unilateral action, such as NGO litigation or
congressional action, compelled countries that had already taken action to adopt
a tougher stance in the UNEP Working Group negotiations. 2 While the use
of CFCs in aerosol cans had been banned or reduced in some countries, their
use in other products and other countries had continued or increased, potential-
ly nullifying the benefits gained by such cutbacks. 36 Broad cooperation was
clearly needed."
B. The Vienna Ozone Convention Lays the Groundwork
The Working Group held seven sessions and produced over fifty documents
in preparation for the 1985 meeting in Vienna. Ultimately, the Working Group
32. Stratospheric Ozone Protection Plan, 51 Fed. Reg. 1257 (1986).
33. During the summer before the adoption of the Montreal Protocol, an aide to Donald Hodel, then
Secretary of the Department of Interior, suggested to the press that he supported an alternative policy of
'personal protection," which amounted to wearing hats, sun glasses, and suntan lotion for protection
because skin cancer was a self-inflicted disease attributable to lifestyle preferences. Not surprisingly, this
rumor backfired, and Hodel was lampooned by the media across the country. R. BENEDICK, supra note
5, at 60. The Senate passed a resolution calling for a CFC phaseout by a vote of 80 to 2. S. Res. 226,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., CONG. REc. 77,510 (1987).
34. There has been a long-standing debate about the wisdom of pursuing a multilateral strategy at
the expense of unilateral action. The notion of what constitutes a strong player at the negotiating table is
central to this debate. Some argue that being a big polluter, in this case a large consumer of CFCs,
strengthens a state's legitimacy in negotiating reductions. See Clausen, Moving Forward Together, ENVrL.
FORUM, July-Aug. 1988, at 14. Others argue the contrary position, stating that a state's commitment to
unilateral action creates the basis for its sovereign legitimacy. The latter group argues that unilateral action
is an effective precursor to international action in two ways; it serves as an example to other nations and
it can be used as leverage to gain multilateral cooperation. See Shimberg, A Sound Framework, A Flawed
Regulation, ENVTL. FORUM, July-Aug. 1988, at 15.
35. Member states of the Toronto Group have already taken unilateral action to limit aerosol use of
CFCs and thus have little to lose and a great deal to gain, both environmentally and economically, in urging
countries to follow their lead. Report of the Working Group: First Part of the Third Session, U.N. Environ-
ment Programme, U.N. Doc. EP/WG.94/5 (1983).
36. Shea, supra note 12, at 20.
37. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 4.
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could not agree on a control protocol, and the countries signed only a frame-
work convention, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
(Vienna Ozone Convention).3" However, those states attending did pledge to
adopt a control protocol within two years.39 Surprisingly, the course of events
yielded a far more significant proposal in Montreal.
Following the adoption of the Vienna Ozone Convention, UNEP sponsored
two workshops on control measures to present data relevant to a control
protocol."° There were no official delegations, and participants ranged from
United Nations officials, academics, environmentalists, industry representa-
tives, to developed and developing country officials.41 The second workshop,
held in a rural setting outside of Washington, D.C., replete with barbecues and
bluegrass music, was especially pivotal in moving the parties toward an
agreement, perhaps because the informal setting allowed frank discussion and
deemphasized the divisions between different positions.42 Interestingly, this
may have been the first time that United States NGOs, who had for years been
building media and public concern, lobbying Congress, and pressuring the EPA
to regulate CFCs, participated in any significant numbers in an international
forum.
The United States and Canada, with support from the Executive Director
of UNEP, Mustafa Tolba, took the lead at the subsequent Working Group
meetings by advocating a stringent control measure. Nonetheless, it was far
from certain what would emerge from the Montreal meeting. Negotiations
lasted for days and nights as the agreement took shape. Debate centered around
the extent of the cutbacks, the chemicals to be included, and the treatment of
developing countries with low levels of CFC use.43 On September 16, 1987,
the representatives of twenty-four nations signed the Montreal Protocol, at
which time Tolba declared that "the environment can be a bridge between the
worlds of the East and West, and North and South ... with this agreement
the worlds of science and public affairs have taken a step closer together [to]
a union which must guide the affairs of the world into the next century." More
38. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529
[hereinafter Vienna Ozone Convention].
39. In accord with the resolution, UNEP organized a series of workshops with the aim of preparing
a control protocol for consideration by the parties to the Vienna Ozone Convention in 1987. Report of the
Steering CommitteeMeeting, U.N. EnvironmentProgramme, U.N. Does. EPIWG. 13712 (1985), EPIWG. 1-
37/4 (1985).
40. The primary function of both workshops was to bring experts together to discuss topics related
to a control protocol, such as current and projected CFC production, use, trade, and regulation. Report
of the First Part of the Workshop on the Control of Chlorofluorocarbons, U.N. Environment Programme,
U.N. Doc. EPIWG.148/2 (1986); Report of the Second Part of the Workshop on the Control of Chloro-
fluorocarbons, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Docs. EP/WG.148/3, EP/WG.151/Background 2
(1986).
41. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 47.
42. Id. at 48-49.
43. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 77.
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somberly, he added that "this Protocol is a point of departure.. the begin-
ning of the real work to come."44
C. 1987-1990: the Protocol Is Adopted and Amended
It is ironic that variations in the predictions of ozone depletion -- used to
delay action and progress toward any type of international agreement by
opponents who argued there was insufficient knowledge on which to act --
were later found to uniformly underestimate the loss of ozone.4' As a result
of the flaws in these predictions, the Montreal Protocol was negotiated under
an assumption that serious ozone depletion was still decades away. Shortly
after adoption of the Protocol, a major study of ozone trends disclosed the
existence of an antarctic ozone hole the width of the continental United States
and the depth of Mount Everest.' More importantly, scientists linked the hole
to the accelerated action of man-made chlorine through a complicated chemical
process occurring in cold temperatures on ice crystals. Recent measurements
over the Arctic indicate that real, albeit smaller, reductions of ozone are
occurring over the Arctic as well.47
After the panel revealed its astonishing findings, Du Pont, the world's
largest producer of CFCs and a longtime opponent of CFC reductions, an-
nounced it would accelerate research into substitutes and phase out all produc-
tion of CFCs and halons by the turn of the century. 48 The announcement
sounded the death knell for these chemicals, and provided an opportunity for
United States NGOs to encourage NGOs in Europe and in developing countries
to push for amendments that would completely ban CFCs, halons, and two
other chemicals discovered to have high depletion effects (methyl chloroform
44. Id. at 76.
45. The models' flaws made it difficult to predict ozone loss right up to the signing of the Montreal
Protocol. The major breakthrough came in 1982 when scientists began to measure actual levels of ozone.
Their findings of significantly decreased ozone levels in the Antarctic were so astonishing that British re-
searchers at the Halley Bay station checked and rechecked their equipment and results for over three years
before releasing their results. When they did, United States and Japanese researchers quickly confirmed
the evidence of an ozone hole larger than the continental United States. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at
18-19.
46. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) concluded that ozone depletion was
occurring at significantly greater rates than those predicted by computer models. NAT'L AERONAUTICS &
SPACE ADMIN., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL OZONE TRENDS PANEL 4 (1988). Where the models
predicted decreases of less than 2% between 1969 and 1986, actual measurements showed an average
decrease of up to 3% over the heavily populated areas of North America and Europe, with decreases of
as much as 6.2% during the winter months. Id. at 4-5. Recent data from NASA measured losses of 4%
to 8% over large portions of North America. In Washington, D.C., losses are as high as 6% and are occur-
ring in the spring, when people spend a lot more time outdoors. See supra note 7. The new data -
described by the EPA Administrator, William Reilly, as "stunning information [that] possesses implications
we have not yet had time to fully explore" - will undoubtedly spark an interest in tightening the amended
schedules under the Montreal Protocol. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
47. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1990, at A25, col. 1.
48. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 111-12.
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and carbon tetrachloride)." Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace affiliates
succeeded in enlisting the support of Great Britain, which was once the leading
European opponent of controls.5 0 The "green" movement in West Germany
made it politically expedient for the leaders of that country, another major
CFC producer, to announce a ninety-five percent unilateral reduction and to
use its position as head of the EC to tighten the requirements for the European
bloc. 5 These efforts contributed to a remarkable feat of international coordi-
nation and unity when over ninety NGOs from around the world -- represent-
ing twenty-seven nations from Africa, North and South America, and Eastern
and Western Europe - met in London and issued a statement calling for
immediate international action.52
As a result of the scientific findings and the pressure by NGOs, many
major users and producers of CFCs, such as the United States, the European
Community, and Japan, announced their intention to act faster and more
comprehensively than the original agreement required.53 Not long thereafter,
49. Four major environmental groups - Greenpeace, National Toxics Campaign, Clean Water Action
Project, and U.S. PIRG - launched a grassroots campaign to win support for safe alternatives to ozone-
depleting chemicals and products. See Grassroots Campaign Aims at Winning Support for Measures to
ProtectEarth's Ozone Layer, 12 Int'l Env't Current Rep. (BNA) No.5, at 244 (May 10, 1989). Greenpeace
and the NRDC called for the addition of ozone-depleting chemicals, methyl chloroform and carbon
tetrachloride. See Greenpeace Says Two Cleaning Solvents Should Be Covered by Montreal Protocol, Int'l
Env't Current Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 535 (Nov. 8, 1989). And the Environmental Defense Fund also
issued a report on the ecological hazards of ozone depletion. See Scientists Report Antarctic Ozone Hole
Letting in More Radiation Than Expected, 12 Int'l Env't Current Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 175 (Apr. 12,
1989).
50. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 114. The British government was well-known for its position
opposing strong international controls and its attempts to delay any agreement. Its positions were almost
synonymous with those of its largest producer, Imperial Chemical Industries, which was a large foreign
exchange earner for the country. Unites States Ambassador Richard Benedick describes a time when the
British government called on the State Department to curtail a negative campaign by United States environ-
mentalists in Great Britain. Id. at 39. He also describes having encouraged the same organizations to
galvanize their European counterparts to offset the influence of the European CFC industry. Id. at 28.
51. West Germany was instrumental in the EC Council decision to disallow the EC "bubble" for
reductions, thereby requiring each country to meet all of its reductions on its own. Id. See also Greens
Call for Ban on Production, Use of Ozone-Depleting Chlorofluorocarbons, 12 Int'l Env't Current Rep.
(BNA) No. 8, at 396 (Aug. 9, 1989).
52. International Environmental Community Callsfor Strengthened Montreal Protocol, 12 Int'l Env't
Current Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 228 (May 10, 1989). The NGO statement described the state of current
scientific understanding of the contribution of CFCs to the depletion of the ozone layer and global warming,
and warned that unless the Montreal Protocol was made significantly stronger, efforts to halt ozone
depletion would be meaningless. At the meeting, before the parties convened to adopt the amendments,
NGOs presented a detailed paper calling for: 1) rapid and complete phaseout of the CFCs and halons now
subject to the Protocol and restrictions on other ozone-depleting chemicals by 1995; 2) adoption of a dual
strategy of international cooperation and national action to assure the fastest possible emissions reductions
by the greatest number of nations; and 3) interim steps including an absolute ban on all aerosol and other
frivolous uses of CFCs by 1991, stronger trade restrictions against nonsignatory states and violators, and
adoption of an internationally standardized label to inform consumers of the CFC content of products. Draft
of Statement by the International Environmental Community Concerning the Urgent Need to Strengthen
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer-(Feb. 8, 1989) (on file with author).
53. See Report Projects Antarctic Ozone Depletion to Continue for Decades, Sees Marine Damage,
12 Int'l Env't Current Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 168 (Apr. 12, 1989); Nation Willing to Freeze CFC Produc-
tion if Given the Technology for Substitutes, 13 Int'l Env't Current Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 65 (July 11,
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in June 1990, the parties met in London to respond to evidence of more rapid
ozone-layer depletion and to meet the demands of developing countries. The
meetings in London produced amendments that, if ratified, would significantly
strengthen the Montreal Protocol. 4
To encourage broad membership, the parties required at least eleven states,
comprising two-thirds of.the global consumption of CFCs and halons, to ratify
the Montreal Protocol before it could enter into force.' This goal has been
exceeded. Presently, over sixty countries have ratified the Protocol, repre-
senting ninety percent of the consumption of those substances controlled under
the original agreement.5 6 In addition, countries that have not yet ratified the
Protocol demonstrated their strong interest in the Protocol during the last
meeting of the parties, in which nonparties showed up in greater numbers than
parties.
There has been substantial concern that developing countries with a large
potential for future growth might not join the agreement. However, by the time
the parties met to consider amending the agreement in June 1990, over half
the countries that had ratified the agreement were developing countries. Many
of the nonparties at the 1990 meeting were developing countries that lobbied
strenuously for adoption of the Multilateral Fund. India and China, the two
most important developing states, declared their intention to ratify the Montreal
Protocol if the Fund were adopted.57
Ratification of the London Amendments is the next challenge. To date only
Canada and New Zealand have ratified the Amendments. 8 While phasing out
those chemicals covered in the original agreement are merely considered
"adjustments," the cutback of additional chemicals and the establishment of
the Multilateral Fund require ratification by each party.59 While countries
may comply for symbolic purposes, countries must ratify by the target date
of January 1, 1992 for the 1990 Amendments to take effect on time."
The adoption of the Montreal Protocol represents a landmark step in the
international environmental regime. The Protocol with its London Amendments
will set up an elaborate international framework and a myriad of national
1990).
54. See London Amendments, supra note 4.
55. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 16.
56. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
57. Both China and India, with over 40% of the world's population, were careflly considered by
the parties. China was chosen by the Working Group, prior to adoption of the London Amendments, for
a study of the incremental costs of shifting to substitutes. The study estimated that China would need $42
million over the next three years, and, perhaps more importantly, suggested that there were identifiable
steps China could take to reduce its prospective reliance on targeted chemicals. The Working Group
calculated that if India were to join, an additional $40 million would be needed to help meet its costs. R.
BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 187.
58. Telephone interview with Treaty Section of United Nations (Mar. 22, 1991).
59. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 146.
60. London Amendments, supra note 4, annex If, art. 2.
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programs. The agreement will make possible a ban on the chemicals most
harmful to the ozone layer and encourage a market shift to substitutes, a shift
that could only be accomplished through international agreement.
A combination of factors made the agreement possible. One of the more
salient factors was the leadership demonstrated by the United States, a govern-
ment strengthened by an environmentally concerned Congress, by NRDC
litigation, and by the chemical industry's .desire for a "level playing field" to
assure a global market for its substitutes.6 United States NGOs helped signif-
icantly to keep the United States position strong and to bolster that position
abroad by devoting considerable resources to an ozone protection campaign.62
Recognizing that the support of both the producer and user industries was
crucial to a strong agreement, they built coalitions in the private as well as
public sector.63 At the international level, the United States NGOs interacted
regularly with the UNEP negotiators and environmental NGOs in a large
number of countries." European NGOs applied similar national strategies.
Together, United States, European, and developing countries' NGOs formed
an impressive coalition prior to the adoption of the London Amendments to
put pressure on all states in the international forum to press for controls on
ozone-depleting chemicals. This dual strategy of influencing national policy
in countries with responsive political systems; and of participating in interna-
tional meetings to influence other governments, proved successful.65
61. According to Ambassador Benedick, when the State Department was called upon to justify its
strong negotiating position in a meeting with President Reagan, it cited the potential for further unilateral
action, the low threshold for regulatory action under the Clean Air Actpending congressional legislation,
and the NRDC litigation that had ordered the EPA to take action. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 66.
62. The NRDC has recently launched an Atmospheric Protection Initiative. One of its senior attorneys,
David Doniger, has worked closely with the United States government, NGOs, and scientists and policy-
makers. The NRDC has also pursued ozone protection in court. Friends of the Earth (FOE) has made ozone
protection one of its major issues and is working closely with its international office in London. It publishes
Atmosphere, a quarterly newsletter on current developments in this area. These organizations exemplify,
but by no means exhaust, the work by many organizations concerned about depletion of the ozone layer.
63. CFC producers and users were encouraged to join a "CFC-Free" club by well-known groups that
would, in turn, commend companies announcing plans for voluntary phaseouts of controlled chemicals.
See Statement of Support for the Foodservice Packaging Institute's Fully Halogenated Chlorofluorocarbon
Voluntary Phaseout Program, by Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund &
Friends of the Earth (Apr. 12, 1988) (on file with author). For examples of industry announcements
supporting phaseout of CFCs, see statements by Allied Chemicals, Du Pont, Foodservice Packaging
Institute, Inc., and the United States Council for International Business (on file with author).
64. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
65. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 5-7, 25. The author states that the private sector organizations -
- both environmental and industrial - warned the public of the risk of ozone depletion, pressured govern-
ments to act, pressed for research and legislation, and served as observers in the international meetings,
making views known to government and media. Id. at5. For example, an EPA official described as pivotal
the statement made by NRDC's Doniger that damage to the ozone layer will be the next asbestos and
Dalkon Shield disaster for industry. Telephone interview with Stephen Seidel, Stratospheric Protection
Program, Office of Air and Radiation, EPA (Apr. 12, 1991).
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Il. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL, ITS AMENDMENTS, AND NATIONAL
LEGISLATION
The drafters of the Montreal Protocol negotiated with an unwavering
commitment to include as many countries as possible in the agreement. In
making ozone protection a major global initiative, they hoped to encourage a
large-scale switch from ozone-depleting chemicals to substitutes by setting
reduction goals and foreclosing as many markets as possible for ozone-deplet-
ing chemicals. To maximize the number of parties joining at the outset, the
drafters chose a "top down" approach, one that mandates goals and deadlines
but allows states the flexibility to choose their own means of phasing out
restricted chemicals. A "top down" approach encourages participation by states
that might otherwise find the requirements too Draconian or a threat to their
sovereignty." This approach allows states to develop their own policies and
regulations for meeting their obligations to reduce ozone consumption.67
Trade benefits and exceptions negotiated by concerned parties also encourage
states to join.6"
The strides made at the national level in the United States, which were
brought about by environmental organizations and concerned citizens, are
equally impressive. In 1989, over 100 bills in twenty-four states were intro-
duced calling for CFC restrictions. 69 Also in 1989, the EPA agreed to issue
regulations under the authority of the Clean Air Act in a settlement with the
NRDC.7° A year later, Congress passed a reauthorized Clean Air Act -- pro-
posed and supported by a coalition of environmental, health, and labor organi-
zations - containing stringent provisions for the control of CFCs and other
ozone-depleting chemicals.7" Congress made it clear in the amendments to
the Clean Air Act that it intended the EPA to go further than the Montreal
Protocol to protect the ozone layer. The amendments not only put the United
66. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2; London Amendments, supra note 4, annex I, at 1-3
(amendiiig arts. 2A-2B).
67. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3; London Amendments, supra note 4, annex II, at 6
(amending art. 3).
68. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 4 & 5.
69. Of 104 bills introduced, 51 pertained to foam-packaging or insulation, 30 pertained to air
conditioning and refrigeration use, and the remainder dealt with miscellaneous-use categories and labelling
programs. Document produced by the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy (Nov. 16, 1989) (on file with
author).
70. In a settlement between the NRDC and the United States Government on May 31, 1989, the EPA
was ordered to promulgate regulations for ozone-depleting substances exceeding the requirements of the
Montreal Protocol to fulfill its obligations under section 157(b) of the Clean Air Act. NRDC v. William
K. Reilly, No. 88-1727 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Article 2(1) of the Protocol states that parties may take actions
more stringent than those required. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4.




States reduction obligations on a faster track,' but also addressed issues the
Montreal Protocol ignored, such as recycling ozone-depleting chemicals and
certifying safe substitutes.'
A. The Requirements of the Protocol and the London Amendments
Most of the production and consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals is
concentrated in developed countries.74 For this reason, the immediate focus
of the Montreal Protocol is on reductions in the United States, Europe, USSR,
and Japan. After much debate, the parties agreed that each country's reduction
obligation would be determined by a formula based on its 1986 consumption
of restricted chemicals.75 Even though production is easier to measure, the
parties chose a formula that focuses on consumption to minimize any incentives
that importing states might have to build their own capacity as supplies dwin-
dled. The EC argued strenuously against a focus on consumption, fearing that
as consumption declined in the United States, American producers would look
to markets in developing countries that had long been in the purview of
European companies.76 The parties ultimately compromised, focusing the
formula on consumption but requiring additional reporting on production,
72. Under the London Amendments, the production of CFCs, halons, and carbon tetrachloride will
be terminated by 1999. Two years later, production of methyl chloroform will be terminated, with only
minor exceptions for medical purposes and other essential uses. Id. § 604. In the interim, production will
be reduced in annual increments, faster than what is required under the Montreal Protocol. A general
provision requires the EPA to accelerate the phaseout schedules if the administrator determines that new
scientific evidence indicates that additional steps are necessary to protect human health or the environment.
It also allows the EPA to accelerate the schedules to coincide with the Protocol if it becomes more stringent
than the Clean Air Act. Id. § 606.
73. The London Amendments impose requirements on recycling, the prohibition and labelling of
products, and the production of HCFCs. First, in 1992, the EPA must adopt regulations to maximize the
capture and recycling of CFCs, carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform. Id. § 608(a)(1). The EPA
will also regulate the air-condition servicing industry. Id. § 608(a)(2). This requires that service people
be trained and certified in recycling. Id. § 609(b)(4)(2). Second, over the next four years, the sale of
"nonessential" products containing CFCs and the other ozone-depleting chemicals will be prohibited. Id.
§ 610. Products manufactured with these chemicals will be required to carry labels informing consumers.
Id. § 611. Lastly, while the Montreal Protocol lists HCFCs as "transitional substances" but does not
mandate controls, the Clean Air Act provisions will curtail their production in 2015 when any "new use"
of the chemicals will be banned. Id. § 605(a). After 2030, all production must be terminated. Id. §
605(b)(2). These isomers of CFCs, touted as substitutes, deplete the ozone layer at about one-twentieth
the rate of CFCs. Additionally,-the EPA must set standards for safe substitutes. Id. § 612(c).
74. The industrialized countries use 88% of the CFCs and more than 20 times the amount per capita
than developing countries. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 148-49. See also supra note 15 and accompany-
ing text.
75. The Montreal Protocol's formula for consumption is defined as production plus imports minus
exports of restricted chemicals. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1, para. 6. Amounts exported are
excluded from the consumption calculation of the exporting state because they are presumed to be included i
in the consumption calculation of the importing state. To eliminate "losses" to nonparty states, exports to
these states cannot be subtracted after 1993. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3, para. c. No changes
to paragraph (c) were included in the 1990 London Amendments.
76. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 79-80.
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exports, and imports. 77 Moreover, parties cannot export to nonparty states
after 1993 and cannot produce more than ten percent over their domestic
consumption quota for export to developing countries.78
The agreement's second purpose was to discourage the huge potential
increase in the production and consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals in
developing countries.79 While relatively few lesser developed countries partic-
ipated in the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol itself, they made a strong
case for delaying the imposition of the control requirements by arguing that
they needed time and help in making the transition from technology utilizing
CFCs to new substitute technologies.8" There was also strong sentiment
among many of the developing countries that the issue was "a rich man's
problem [requiring a] rich man's solution," and that on account because of the
greediness of developed countries, they were being asked to curtail their
modernization."1
Under the original agreement, developing countries with a low per capita
use of CFCs and other chemicals were granted a ten-year delay in meeting the
reduction goals.8 2 They also were promised financial and technological help,
but in terms too vague to be meaningful.Y Not surprisingly, dissatisfaction
with the agreement grew among developing countries when it became apparent
that CFCs, other ozone-depleting chemicals, and dependant technologies were
slated for obsolescence in developed countries. Concern that substitutes might
not be available fast enough to meet their rising domestic needs spurred a
dramatic shift in the negotiating strategy of developing countries between the
Montreal and London meetings."
77. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 7, para. 2.
78. Id. (requirements found in art. 3, para. c & art. 2, para. 1).
79. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 151.
80. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1989, at D18, col. 3.
81. India's representative made this comment in a private conversation after the negotiations in
Montreal were completed. India had bought CFC-producing technology from United States companies
Allied Chemical and Pennwalt prior to the negotiations and, as a result, would have significant amounts
available for export. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 100-01.
82. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5. This provision allows parties with a per capita use of
controlled substances of less than 0.3 kilograms at the time the agreement enters into force to delay its
compliance for 10 years in order to *meet its basic domestic needs". Id. at art. 5, para. 1. The provision
limiting use to "basic domestic needs" has been controversial. There was concern that developing countries
could produce up to the 0.3 kilogram cap for export and that this would greatly diminish the effectiveness
of the agreement. See Tripp, The UNEP Montreal Protocol: Industrialized and Developing Countries
Sharing the ResponsibilityforProtecting the Stratospheric Ozone Layer, 20 J. INT'L L. & POL. 743 (1988).
However, it was decided that producing CFCs for export would not be in the spirit of the agreement and
thus could not fall under "basic domestic needs."
83. These provisions directed the parties to facilitate developing country access to environmentally
safe substances and technology, and to make funds available. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5, para.
2&3.
84. China, for example, uses only one-fortieth of the amount per capita that industrialized countries
use, but its use is rising 20% every year. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 149-50.
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In what was perhaps the most significant agreement made in the London
Amendments, the parties provided for a Multilateral Fund to help developing
countries meet the reduction requirements on the same schedule as developed
countries.as After long negotiations, the parties agreed to a resolution setting
up a three-year interim fund to provide $160 to $240 million to developing
countries to meet their incremental costs of compliance until the Amendments
had entered into force.86 Putting developing countries on track with developed
countries will eliminate incentives to continue trade in ozone-depleting chemi-
cals, and will have an enormous impact on the rate that ozone-depleting
chemicals disappear from the global market." While the original Montreal
Protocol would have reduced CFCs by fifty percent and frozen halofis at 1986
levels, the London Amendments would phase out both of these chemicals along
with two additional chemicals -- carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform -
- by the year 2000.8 Interim reductions, beginning as early as 1993, will
also encourage countries to reduce their reliance on banned chemicals.89
Another important feature of the Montreal Protocol is the use of trade
benefits to encourage states to join the agreement. While the Multilateral Fund
serves as an enforcement tool for developing countries by conditioning funding
on compliance, the trade provisions, which allow trade of restricted chemicals
85. London Amendments, supra note 4, annex II, at 12-13 (amending article 10).
86. The figure was arrived at after an EPA assessment of the incremental costs per year for develop-
ing country compliance. The Multilateral Fund itself is part of the London Amendments and is to be
administered by an executive committee of 14 parties, to make grants, act as a clearinghouse for technical
cooperation and training, and facilitate and monitor other multilateral and bilateral avenues for aid. Id. at
annexes II, IV, V.
87. London Amendments, supra note 4, annex II. Efforts to put in place a fund have been ongoing
since adoption of the Montreal Protocol. The 80 nations that attended the first meeting of the parties in
1989 in Helsinki adopted a declaration agreeing to phase out all production of the ozone-depleting
chlorofluorocarbons, and urged the adoption of a fund to help developing countries adhere to a worldwide
ban. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1989, at A6, col. 1. The United States, led by White House Chief of Staff John
Sununu, opposed a fund until the parties met to adopt amendments in 1990. Wall St. J., June 18, 1990,
at A7, col. 4. The United States later reversed its position, but insisted on a clause stating that adoption
of the Multilateral Fund should not be considered a precedent for future international agreements. London
Amendments, supra note 4, at 11-14 (amending article 10).
88. Annex A lists CFCs and halons. Group I is composed of CFCs-11, 12, 113, 114, and 115, which
are used primarily in refrigeration, industrial processes, and foam insulation. Group II includes halons-1211,
1301, and 2402, which are used primarily in fighting fires. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, annex A.
The London Amendments would add to the Montreal Protocol an annex B that includes additional CFCs
in group 1, carbon tetrachloride in group 2, and methyl chloroform in group 3, and an annex C composed
of isomers of chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), which deplete the ozone layer to a lesser degree than the annex
A and B chemicals. No controls on annex C are mandated by the London Amendments. London Amend-
ments, supra note 4, annex II, at 16.
89. Under the London Amendments, the CFCs and halons listed in annex A to the Montreal Protocol
would be reduced by 50% by 1995 and 85% by 1997. The additional CFCs in group 1 of annex B would
be reduced by 20% by 1993, 85% by 1997, and phased out by 2000. Carbon tetrachloride as restricted
in group 2 of annex B would be reduced by 85% by 1995, and phased out by 2000. Methyl chloroform,
restricted in group 3 of annex B, would be frozen by 1993, reduced by 30% by 1995, reduced by 70%
by 1997, and phased out by 2005. Because the Protocol was signed in 1987, a baseline of 1986 was selected
for annex A chemicals. This baseline is not altered by the Amendments. However, the Amendments would
set a baseline of 1989 for annex B chemicals. London Amendments, supra note 4, annex II.
Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 16:519, 1991
among parties, but limit trade of chemicals with nonparty states, 90 are essen-
tially the only enforcement mechanism for developed states. 91 Trade in CFCs
is substantial. The United States alone, with approximately thirty percent of
the market in CFCs, produced $750 million dollars worth of CFCs in 1985,
and provided $28 billion dollars worth of goods and services to the global CFC
market.92 In the EC, which has approximately forty-five percent of the mar-
ket, exports currently account for over one third' of this production and go
primarily to developing countries.' Because the Protocol permits parties to
continue to produce, consume, and trade in ozone-depleting chemicals until
the turn of the century (albeit at reduced levels), states may actually prefer to
join the Protocol rather than be cut off from the export or import opportunities
associated with party states.94 The trade restrictions currently apply only to
raw chemicals, but will be extended to products containing targeted chemicals
and possibly to products made with targeted chemicals, if the parties do not
object. 95
Although the trade provisions are not as ambitious as they might seem, they
nevertheless serve as "carrots" to states that become parties and "sticks" to
states that do not.96 There is evidence that the trade restrictions are having
the desired effect of encouraging states to join the Montreal Protocol or, at a
minimum, to comply with its reduction requirements. 7 Although a sticky
90. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 5.
91. India is the only developing country with an exportable surplus of CFCs. See Change to CFC-
Substitute Production Would Cost India $2 Billion, UNEP Says, 13 Int'l Env't Current Rep. (BNA) No.
4, at 171 (June 13, 1990).
92. Shea, supra note 12, at 19.
93. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 26.
94. Id. at art. 4. Parties are prohibited from importing annex A chemicals from nonparty states after
1990 and annex B chemicals after 1991. Parties are discouraged, but not prohibited, from exporting to
nonparty states. Parties cannot subtract from their consumption calculation exports to nonparty states after
1993 for annex A chemicals, and after 1994 for annex B chemicals. Additionally, parties are to discourage
the export to nonparties of any technology that facilitates the production or utilization of restricted
chemicals. Under the Clean Air Act amendments, the president is directed to prohibit the export of such
technology or investment in facilities abroad making any chemical listed in the annexes. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 614(c), 104 Stat. 2399, 2668 (1990).
95. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4. By 1992, parties are to draw up a list of products
containing controlled chemicals. Parties not objecting to the list are prohibited from importing these
products from nonparties within a year of the ban becoming effective. By 1994, parties are to determine
the feasibility of banning products made with, but not containing, controlled chemicals. If feasible, parties
will draw up a list and, within a year and a half, those not objecting to this list are prohibited from import-
ing these products from nonparties. The London Amendments would add the chemicals listed in annex B,
but on a slightly more relaxed schedule. London Amendments, supra note 4, annex II.
96. The Protocol encourages nonparty states to comply with the control measures by lifting the ban
against imports from such states if they can show compliance with the control requirements applicable to
member states. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 8.
97. Shortly after the Montreal Protocol was adopted, the EC producers of CFCs agreed not to transfer
technology for the production of CFCs to nonparties. See EC Producers of CFCs Agree Not to Transfer
Know-How to Non-Parties to MontrealAccord, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.12, at 650 (Dec. 14, 1988).
In the recently enacted Clean Air Act Amendments, the president is prohibited from transferring technology
used to produce restricted chemicals to nonparty states. See supra note 94. More recently, Taiwan, which
is not a member of the United Nations and therefore cannot become a party to the Montreal Protocol, is
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problem could potentially arise if a state has ratified theProtocol but not the
London Amendments, states not ratifying the Amendments will be considered
nonparties for the purpose of trade in the additional chemicals covered by the
Amendments under the current interpretation.9"
The agreement's noncompliance clause is not usually found in treaties
outside of the arms control arena.9 In the negotiations preceding the adoption
of the London Amendments in 1990, the parties were only able to agree on
an interim noncompliance procedure."°° If ratified, the procedure would set
up an Implementation Committee to review alleged noncompliance by parties
and report back to all parties. However, the language is vague about how the
Implementation Committee would conduct its investigation and what steps
might be appropriate to reprimand noncomplying parties so as to ensure that
parties meet their obligations."' Data reporting is obviously crucial in deter-
mining compliance, and discussions concerning the confidential treatment of
data during the meetings prior to adoption of the London Amendments were
contentious. The parties finally agreed to restrict access to nonaggregated
production data to UNEP at the request of reporting parties, but to make all
consumption data nonconfidential.l °2
voluntarily complying with the agreement so as not to lose its trade benefits with party states. See Republic
Battles "Environmental Mess with Far-Reaching Programs, New Laws, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
1, at 5 (June 13, 1990).
98. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 179.
99. Id. at 98-99. The Montreal Protocol instructs the first meeting of the parties to elaborate on the
noncompliance provision of article 8 of the Protocol. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8. At the first
meeting, the parties set up a working group, the open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal Experts,
to discuss the shape of noncompliance procedures. There was stark disagreement at the second meeting
about the appropriate strength of the procedures, and the result of that meeting was that noncompliance
procedures were adopted on an interim basis. Interview with Sue Biniaz, Attorney with the Legal Advisor's
Office, State Department (May 3, 1991).
100. London Amendments, supra note 4, annex III. Interestingly, there is a dispute resolution
provision in the Vienna Ozone Convention requiring parties to negotiate, and, if they cannot reach
agreement through negotiation, to seek mediation by a third party. Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note
38, art. 11. States may accept compulsory arbitration or submission of the dispute to the International Court
of Justice (10) once they make a declaration to that effect with the Depository of the Convention. If the
parties have not accepted either method of resolution, then the dispute is submitted to a conciliation
commission which will hear both parties. This provision applies to any subsequent protocol unless otherwise
provided in that protocol, and thus raises an interesting question of whether it is superseded by the interim
noncompliance provision. As of March 26, 1991, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden submitted
declarations accepting both arbitration and the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory forms of dispute
settlement. The EC accepted only arbitration. No other parties submitted declarations. Correspondence with
the Treaty Section of the United Nations (Mar. 26, 1991).
101. London Amendments, supra note 4, annex III. The procedure would allow parties to submit
concerns to the UNEP Secretariat about another party's implementation of its obligations. The party whose
compliance is at issue is permitted a reasonable opportunity to respond. The Secretariat then forwards the
submission, any response, and other information available from the parties and Secretariatto the Implemen-
tation Committee. This Committee then reports to the meeting of the parties on possible resolution, and
the parties can decide what steps to take to further the Montreal Protocol's objectives.
102. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 127. The EC took the lead in trying to weaken the data reporting
requirements, arguing that the EC countries should be allowed to aggregate their figures on production
and consumption on trade secret protection grounds. This argument was rejected by parties who argued
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The office of the UNEP Secretariat is at the center of the Montreal Proto-
col's implementation procedures. As a separate office within UNEP, it serves
primarily as an unbiased representative of the parties to interpret the Protocol
and aid in its implementation.1" The Secretariat monitors party progress in
meeting reduction requirements, determines the application of trade restric-
tions, calls the meetings of the parties, and works with the Implementation
Committee and the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund. Because
the Protocol is self-policing, and uses data collecting and monitoring as the
primary means of determining compliance, the Secretariat is critical in enforc-
ing the agreement.
B. The Merits of the Protocol Approach and the Role of NGOs
The Montreal Protocol's "top down" approach is attractive for a number
of reasons. Merely by becoming parties to the Protocol, states share a common
definition of the problem and a plan to address it. 14 To meet their obliga-
tions under the Protocol, they must agree to specific goals, time schedules, and
promulgation of national programs. The larger the number of parties to the
agreement, the faster markets for ozone-depleting chemicals will decline and
manufacturers will move to substitutes. Additionally, the Multilateral Fund and
the trade provisions create strong incentives for states to join and, because of
trade sanctions, to encourage their trading partners to join as well. The UNEP
Secretariat centralizes monitoring, data collection, and administration of the
agreement for the parties.
The Montreal Protocol has three major weaknesses, however, all of which
must be corrected by adopting more aggressive monitoring and compliance
provisions. First, the structure of the agreement made it imperative that a large
number of states become members. The drafters made concessions to states
that could significantly alter the success of the agreement by slowing the pace
of CFC reduction to accomplish that goal. Second, the agreement is necessarily
quite flexible, since it leaves to individual countries the responsibility for
adopting their own programs for eliminating targeted chemicals. This flexibili-
ty, however, will make the monitoring and verifying of compliance more
difficult. Finally, the agreement's compliance scheme is inherently weak. The
that reporting was in the public interest. The eventual compromise allowed aggregation for trade but not
for consumption, thus masking actual production figures on a state by state basis. Id. at 182. See also
London Amendments, supra note 4, at 15 (reporting decision 1119).
103. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 12.
104. The preamble of the Montreal Protocol states that "world-wide emissions of certain substances
can significantly deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to result in adverse
effects on human health and the environment... [the parties to this Protocol are] determined to protect
the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances
that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their elimination." Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, preamble.
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reason for this is that the main mechanism for encouraging compliance is the
monitoring of country-supplied data by the Implementation Committee and the
UNEP Secretariat. Both of these organizations are too small to be effective
in this role.
1. Many States Must Comply to Realize the Protocol's Goals
In focusing on consumption, the Montreal Protocol requires participation
by a larger group of states than would be necessary under a production formu-
la.1 5 The drafters of the agreement made a number of exceptions to the
Protocol's requirements to entice parties to sign. The most significant provides
a grace period to developing countries (the Article V exception). Another
important exception permits the "trading" of obligations between parties (the
EC exception), while a third exception is equivalent to a grandfather clause
for states with plans for CFC-producing facilities that predate the signing of
the Protocol (the USSR exception).
The exception for developing countries allows any country consuming less
than 0.3 kilograms of CFCs per capita to delay complying.with the control
requirements for up to ten years to meet "basic domestic needs." 1" To illus-
trate the ramifications of this exception, an increase from the current world-
wide average use of 0.2 kilograms of CFCs per capita to the 0.3 kilograms
per capita allowed in developing countries would increase the worldwide
production and use of CFCs by fifty percent by 1999.17 Even a long-term
use of only ten percent of the 1986 levels of CFCs would only delay eliminat-
ing the ozone hole until the end of the twenty-second century.108 This excep-
tion, however, will probably not lead to increased levels of. CFC use due to
the developing countries' desire to share in the Multilateral Fund, a benefit
available only to those reducing their CFC use on schedule. Nonetheless, the
success of the Fund is critical, for the agreement explicitly protects parties
from noncompliance penalties if they are operating under Article V and are
105. The obvious reason for this is that production is concentrated in the hands of a very few parties,
while consumption is dispersed among many consumers. See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Protection
of Stratospheric Ozone, app. D (Aug. 1, 1988) (containing data breaking down production and consumption
among countries).
106. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5.
107. For example, China today uses only 0.02 kilograms per capita (kg/capita) or 18 million
kilograms (kg) compared with the United States, which uses 0.84 kg/capita or 197.4 million kg. China
has five times the population of the United States and enormous potential for increased use of CFCs. Tripp,
supra note 85, at 744 & n.30. The potential demand for refrigerators is often cited as the "bogey man"
of any control program. While the number of refrigerators in China increased by 80% in 1988, household
refrigeration accounts for only 1% of CFC use, and developing countries account for only a small fraction
of that figure. Interestingly, the technology assessment panel calculated that if domestic refrigeration
increased 30% per year in developing countries, the use of CFCs would account for only 2% of the total
global 1986 consumption of CFCs. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 150.
108. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 151.
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unable to meet their requirements because of "inadequate implementation" of
the Multilateral Fund. The London Amendments also provide for a 1995
review of the strides made in financial cooperation and the transfer of technolo-
gy to developing countries, and create an opportunity to revise control require-
ments based on this review."
The exception requested by the EC allows parties to trade obligations with
other parties for the purposes of "industrial rationalization" within regional
economic integration organizations, as long as the total production by the
organization's members does not exceed the sum of the members' production
limits."1 While the EC Council of Ministers has announced that Europe will
not use the production "bubble," this policy could change."' Because only
three of the twelve EC countries reported separate production figures," 2 it
is difficult to determine whether the EC is complying with its stated policy.
The exception for the USSR allows parties in calculating their baseline
production levels to add production from facilities under construction or
contracted for prior to September 1987, as long as the facilities were included
in national legislation before January 1987, thus prior to the adoption of the
Montreal Protocol."' This provision was granted during negotiations over
the selection of 1986 as the baseline year from which to calculate reductions,
and should only effect the Soviet requirements.
Perhaps the most serious exception in the agreement is the treatment of
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) as transitional substances not subject to
a reduction schedule. HCFCs are attractive alternatives to CFCs because they
can be substituted quickly and relatively inexpensively for CFCs. While they
have only 2% to 14% of the ozone-depletion potential of CFCs, extensive use
of HCFCs could delay the recovery of the ozone layer into the twenty-second
century.14 The treatment of HCFCs became one of the most problematic
issues during the negotiations over the London Amendments. Encouraging a
rapid move away from CFCs by promoting investment in substitutes that are
also serious ozone depleters is a poor solution. The compromise, surely to be
revisited at the next meeting of the parties, requires reporting on the produc-
tion, import, and export of HCFCs. It includes a nonbinding resolution declar-
ing that HCFCs should be used only where more environmentally sound
alternatives are not available and should be phased out by 2020 to 2040. The
compromise also requires the Amendments to be reviewed regularly for
additional measures."'
109. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 8.
110. Id. at art. 2, para. 5.
111. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 113.
112. See infra note 121.
113. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 6.
114. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 136.
115. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 174-76.
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Becauseof these exceptions, some environmentalists and policymakers have
estimated that the Montreal Protocol might result in only a 35% to 40%
reduction in CFC consumption by the turn of the century.1 6 Others have
argued that a dramatic shift in the global marketplace from CFCs to substitutes
will reduce CFC consumption beyond the original fifty percent goal of the
Protocol. 1 7 Obviously, the ratification of the London Amendments will bring
about a far larger reduction and will promote the development of substitutes.
But that will mean hard work and commitment to carrying out the technology
transfer and financial cooperation provisions of the Protocol and its Amend-
ments.
2. The Structure of the Protocol Makes Monitoring Difficult
The Montreal Protocol requires that individual states design their own
reduction programs. Instead of mandating a blanket ban on the use of CFCs
in aerosols - a step that would be easy to monitor -- the Protocol allows every
state to reduce CFCs and the other restricted chemicals in whatever way it
chooses provided it can show that it is meeting its reduction requirements. This
structure provides great flexibility, but it takes more time to accomplish,
fragments decision-making, and frustrates monitoring efforts.
Once programs are adopted, the agreement relies on the parties' good faith
efforts to comply. With the exception of countries receiving money from the
Multilateral Fund, there are no explicit penalties for noncompliance. The
parties have the power to act on an ad hoc basis in response to reports from
the Implementation Committee, but it is unclear whether this provision will
be utilized. The fact that there will be many different state plans also increases
the likelihood that changing the direction of these programs will be more diffi-
cult.' To make the agreement responsive to new information about deple-
tion of the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol provides for an amendment
process timed to coincide with its regular scientific, technical, and economic
assessments. 19 For example, the agreement permits parties, through the
116. See Doniger, supra note 4, at 86.
117. For a discussion of the effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol, see Gundling, Hope for the Ozone
Layer?, 1 EuR. ENVrL. REV., Dec. 1987, at 46. See also Letter from G. Victor Buxton, Environment
Canada Official and Chief Canadian Negotiator, to Cynthia Whitehead, Editor of the European Environ-
mental Review (Mar. 23, 1988) (on file with author).
118. Concern was expressed early on about "changing boats in mid-stream" after state representatives
had returned home to have their countries ratify the agreement. The chief negotiator for the United States
argued against tightening the Montreal Protocol prior to its entry into force, saying that it was more
important to encourage countries to ratify what had been agreed to in Montreal than to amend it and risk
losing support. Benedick, A Double Threat to the Ozone Treaty, Int'l Herald Tribune, June 19, 1988, at
18, col. 1.
119. The Montreal Protocol requires that any decision to modify the Protocol be made by consensus
or, if consensus is impossible, be approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the parties present and voting
as long as they make up 50% of the consumption of controlled substances by the parties. The London
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UNEP Secretariat, to call on the Protocol signatories to require sharper
reductions in CFCs.'20 These provisions were crucial in bringing the parties
together to approve the London Amendments.12'
3. The Shortcomings of the UNEP Monitoring Mechanism
The placement of monitoring duties in the UNEP Secretariat may give a
false sense of security. The monitoring carried out by the Secretariat consists
primarily of the review of data submitted by the parties. However, with a
small, impermanent, and underfunded staff, the Secretariat cannot compel
parties to turn over data and will not be able to verify the data that it receives.
If the Secretariat relies on data submitted by the parties, and this data is
incomplete or inaccurate, then measuring the success of the Montreal Protocol
and assessing the need for additional measures will be extremely difficult.
One of the greatest challenges will be collecting data and monitoring the
activities of such a large number of parties. The trade provisions and Multilat-
eral Fund obviously encourage membership, but weak data collection and
compliance monitoring may make it difficult to determine if parties are in fact
fulfilling their obligations. Already, there is evidence that following party
compliance through the reporting requirements may be difficult. Of fifty-five
states required to submit data to the UNEP Secretariat in May of 1990, only
twenty-one countries, including the United States, the USSR, and Japan,
submitted complete data." Only three of the EC countries submitted com-
plete data and four, including Britain, have yet to submit any data."iu In May
1990, in response to the poor reporting record of the parties, UNEP's Mustafa
Amendments would change the stipulation to a majority of parties operating under article 5 and a majority
operating under article 2. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 9(c).
120. The Montreal Protocol requires that by 1990, and at least every four years thereafter, the parties
assess the adequacy of the control requirements of article 2. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6. When
the London Amendments enter into force, articles 2A to 2E and the production, imports and exports of
the transitional substances in group 1 of annex C must be reassessed. London Amendments, supra note
4, annex II at 10 (amending article 6). Based on these assessments, parties may decide whether further
reductions should be undertaken and the scope and timing of these reductions. Montreal Protocol, supra
note 4, art. 2, paras. 9(a), 9(b), 10(a). Proposals are to be communicated to the UNEP Secretariat at least
six months before the meeting of the parties at which time their adoption will be considered. However,
this requirement was interpreted to require only a general proposal, thus enabling the parties to continue
to work right up to the meeting of the parties. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 140-41.
121. Numerous provisions of article 11 of the Montreal Protocol encourage the parties to review the
control measures and to consider and undertake additional action required to achieve the stated objectives.
Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 11.
122. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 181.
123. The EC countries provided an aggregate figure. Only three EC countries - Denmark, Luxem-
bourg and Spain - submitted complete data, and only three - France, the Netherlands, and Spain -
submitted separate production data. Four EC countries - Britain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal - have not
submitted any data at all. Id.
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Tolba sent a letter to all the states suggesting that parties failing to submit data
should be considered in noncompliance.124
The EC and developing countries resisted the efforts of the United States
and the Scandinavian countries to adopt a tougher measure and extend trade
sanctions to noncomplying parties." 5 As a compromise measure, the parties
created the Implementation Committee.126 The Committee serves as an im-
portant forum for reviewing the data and monitoring information collected by
the UNEP Secretariat.127 The Secretariat, in preparing its regular reports for
the parties, may submit information and observations made during its review
of data to the Committee for its consideration. 28 Additionally, parties may
submit complaints to the Secretariat, which must allow the parties whose
compliance is in question an opportunity to respond. The Secretariat then
transmits the complaint, response, along with any additional information, to
the Committee.29
Unfortunately, the provision for the Implementation Committee contains
several weaknesses. The Committee has no powers of investigation or enforce-
ment. Its members are not objective experts, but state representatives who may
politicize the Committee's mission. For example, they may be more hesitant
to put forth tough recommendations for fear that their own countries' programs
will be made the subject of the next review. If the Committee does issue a
critical report, it is unclear what, if anything, the parties will do in response.
Finally, information submitted to the Committee is to be kept confidential,
weakening the incentives for the Committee to aggressively pursue viola-
tions.13°
124. In 1988, there were two Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) on loan to the UNEP Secretariat
who were responsible for the majority of the Secretariat's functions. The JPO position is usually limited
to one year. Interview with Dr. Iwona Rummel-Bulska, Acting Director of the Environmental Law and
Machinery Unit of UNEP, in Nairobi, Kenya (Aug. 1988). The NRDC has routinely urged the United
States Senate to increase UNEP's budget by stressing that UNEP's staff is overworked by implementation
of the Montreal Protocol. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Agencies Appropriations
for Fiscal Year 1990: Hearings on H.R. 2939/H.R. 3743 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations of
the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21-23 (1989) (statementof Thomas B. Stoel,
Jr., Director, Natural Resources Defense Council International Program).
125. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 183.
126. London Amendments, supra note 4, annex III, para 3.
127. At the meeting in June 1990, the parties agreed to a series of decisions including one that
instructs the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal Experts to elaborate further procedures on noncompliance
and enhanced duties for the Implementation Committee by the Fourth Meeting of the Parties. London
Amendments, supra note 4, at 12 (reporting decision 11/5).
128. Under the agreement and amendments, parties must supply specific information on production,
imports, exports, and recapture and destruction of controlled substances. Id. at annex II at 10 (amending
article 7).
129. Id. at annex III, para. 3.
130. Id. at annex III, para. 11.
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IV. STRENGTHENING MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE REGIMES: THEORY
AND EXAMPLES
While the "top down" approach selected by the drafters is appropriate given
the desirability of having many countries ratify the Montreal Protocol, it leaves
too much responsibility in the hands of individual states, has exceptions built
in that could slow the essential progress of the agreement for many years, does
not have adequate mechanisms for punishing states for noncompliance, and
relies too heavily on a UNEP Secretariat ill-equipped to carry out implementa-
tion by itself. Although there are probably many fruitful approaches to take
in addressing these problems, the burgeoning field of regime theory provides
a particularly useful approach by placing these problems in a more theoretical
context. 131
A. Regime Theory
Regime theorists attempt to explain the behavior of actors in a particular
regime.' These theorists look at factors such as reciprocity, reputation,
repetitive dealings, and -- ultimately -- power to explain why and how states
deal with one another.' Regime theory suggests that the process of monitor-
ing and information gathering creates "regime" expectations by providing the
feedback necessary for members to appraise performance.' 34 Such feedback
can help hold members to their obligations and make injunctions meaningful.
One regime theorist, Robert Keohane, argues that injunctions, which prescribe
certain actions and proscribe others, are the essence of a regime. 3 Effective
regimes, according to Keohane, require only a few strong players that recog-
131. For a general introduction to regime theory and international relations theory, see Abbott,
Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectusfor International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335
(1989).
132. Haggard and Simmons categorize regime theorists as structural, game-theoretic, functional or
cognitive. These categories are not exclusive, but they describe what regime theorists emphasize in
explaining regime behavior. Haggard and Simmons argue that all but the cognitive theorists presume unified
rationalactors. Thestructuralistsattempt to show that international conditions define degrees ofcooperation.
The game theorists argue that states cooperate on the basis of preference rankings, while the functionalists
introduce uncertainty and transaction costs as variables in cooperation. Haggard and Simmons describe
their approach as 'cognitive," stating that only the cognitive theorists argue that there is no fixed national
interest or optimal regime. Instead they look at the influence of domestic processes on international
cooperation. Haggard and Simmons, supra note 3, at 498.
133. For an excellent description of how these forces work together to create a nonhierarchical system
of international enforcement of regime expectations, see Haggard & Simmons, supra note 3, at 159.
134. According to Donnelly, the strongest regimes enforce international norms through strong
monitoring mechanisms. The weakest regimes simply promote international norms through international
information exchange, assistance, and perhaps even weak monitoring of international guidelines. Donnelly,
supra note 3, at 604.
135. R. KEOHANE, supra note 1, at 59.
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nize they will benefit from collective action.136 These players will set the
rules of the game, or the injunctions, to ensure that if they play, others will
play as well.
137
Other regime theorists, in particular those who study game theory, believe
that reputation and reciprocity between parties are the essential building blocks
of regime expectations. 3 Parties confer benefits of membership only on
those states that abide by what one theorist, Robert Axelrod, describes as meta-
norms. 139 States that do not abide by these norms can be denied the benefits
of membership. Regime theorists describe this as the "shadow of the future"
in which states, aware that their present actions may alter the future receptivity
of other states to their membership, choose to comply with regime norms.' 4
Most regime theorists assume that negotiations begin when the states come
together and then occur only among states. 141 International negotiations are
in fact multidimensional and are heavily influenced by domestic politics, as
the Montreal Protocol negotiations demonstrated. The players that influenced
the international position of the United States, for example, included NGOs,
private industry, Congress, state and municipal legislatures, and -- in no small
way -- the agencies of the federal government itself. The United States careful-
ly considered its position in regard to the domestic regulatory climate. In
addition, the same NGO, the NRDC, that brought litigation in the United
States under domestic law, organized international NGOs to express their
opinions in one position paper for all the delegations to the Protocol conven-
tion.
One regime theorist who does look at states as multidimensional entities
is Roger Putnam. He criticizes the excessive focus of other theorists on
supranational institutions in the evolution of international agreements. 42
Putnam suggests that domestic politics and third parties strongly influence
136. Regime theorists argue that the emergence of regimes is explained by the need for states to create
forums in which to promote their own self-interested actions, rather than by a desire to improve the world
or by an ideology of collectivism. Id. at 32-39.
137. Id. at 63.
138. The game theorists describe reciprocity in either a one-game model or an iterated-game model.
They describe positive effects on compliance from repeated dealings, or what they call "the shadow of the
future." Reputation is basically recognition and can replace reciprocity in making compliance in a regime
attractive to states. See Axelrod & Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 250 (1985).
139. Axelrod, supra note 2, at 1101.
140. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy, 38 WORLD POL. 1, 3 (1985). See also Axelrod
& Keohane, supra note 138, at 232; R. KEOHANE, supra note 1, at 116.
141. Both Keohane's and Axelrod's suppositions about what drives regimes can be found in varying
degrees within any international negotiation, but they consider international negotiations to be primarily
within the realm of international, rather than domestic, politics.
142. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TWo-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 3,
427 (1988). See also Haggard and Simmons, supra note 3, at 513. They argue that current theories of
international regimes have ignored the influence domestic politics has on international cooperation and,
conversely, the influence regimes have on domestic policy choices.
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regimes, and that interest groups, public opinion, and national and local
politics play a central role in influencing foreign policy.143
In Putnam's model, political leaders engage in negotiating that allows
regime participants to minimize adverse foreign developments while satisfying
domestic demand.1" He describes the negotiating process as having two
stages. First, negotiators bargain in and among themselves and then they
bargain with constituents about the shape and ultimate ratification of the
negotiated agreement. Putnam's two-stage model is important because it
recognizes the influence that domestic political forces, such as "third party
watchdogs," have on international cooperation. Negotiators must also consider
whether they have satisfied all the elements necessary to secure ratifi-
cation.145 In his model, domestic politics broadly defined -- not simply the
role of Congress in the United States, for example, but lobbying by pressure
groups and the influence of public opinion -- play a role in determining the
content of the agreement negotiated abroad. Ultimately, Putnam argues,
politicians will try to shape international agreements in ways that favor approv-
al by domestic constituents while maintaining diplomatic credibility.
Putnam's model recognizes two elements that are powerful in shaping
contemporary events but too often get short shrift in the regime theory litera-
ture: the power of domestic politics and public opinion. A fairly sophisticated
version of the Putnam model is operating today in the context of the Montreal
Protocol. The chief United States negotiator asserts that the major difference
between the positions taken by the United States and the EC can be explained
by the difference in public perception of the threat to the ozone layer." 6
Even before the ban on the use of CFCs in aerosols in 1978, the use of spray
cans in the United States dropped by two-thirds due to an active media and
environmental community that immediately spread the word about the dangers
of CFCs. As a result, the United States government took action quickly under
domestic law and assumed a leadership role in the international negotiations.
On the other hand, European states, which for a long time had neither a press
nor constituents demanding environmental attention, were consistently opposed
to taking action. In fact, the major European CFC-producing industries, ICI
and Atochem, dominated the national politics that shaped the European posi-
143. Putnam, supra note 142, at 432. For example, interest groups can work to influence political
leaders abroad, sometimes even without a leader understanding the intricacies of an interest group's
campaign for a particular negotiating position. Id. at 428, 430, n.5.
144. Putnam describes the negotiations as "two-level games" in which level I negotiations take place
between states and level II negotiations take place between different interests operating within the negotiat-
or's state. Id. at 434.
145. In Putnam's terms, a large "win-set" for a given agreement at Level I is imperative to winning
an up or down ratification at Level II. Id. at 432.
146. R. BENEDICK, supra note 5, at 27.
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tion.147 Thus, the two parties had vastly different domestic political situations
that accounted for their positions.
According to regime theorists, once parties have adopted an agreement,
monitoring by members of the regime and sanctions against nonmembers or
violators then become crucial to deterring potential free-riders. 14 As noted
earlier, however, the Montreal Protocol's current mechanisms for monitoring
and compelling compliance are extremely weak. Putnam's insight into the role
of domestic politics and private organizations in influencing state behavior
suggests a possible solution to the problem of creating a strong monitoring and
compliance regime for the Protocol. Because advocacy by NGOs and private
industry played a critical role in the adoption of the Protocol, incorporating
NGOs into the international compliance regime would be an effective way of
compelling states to abide by their obligations. Such a role would allow NGOs
to bring systematic domestic political pressure to bear on noncomplying states.
The ozone-protection regime is well'set to accommodate such structural
additions. The parties have agreed to the concept of implementation and
compliance procedures, have grown accustomed to working closely with NGOs
and industry, and have already centralized the existing monitoring and compli-
ance mechanisms.
Expanding the monitoring and compliance mechanisms of the Montreal
Protocol on the international level is critically important, and recent work in
regime theory suggests that reliance on NGOs for monitoring and enforcement
may be an effective solution. Such a regime need not be developed completely
from scratch for there already exist three regimes that address problems similar
in crucial respects to those addressed by the Protocol. These are the human
rights regime, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In particular, these regimes are valuable
objects of study because they provide examples of monitoring and compliance
mechanisms that rely significantly on NGOs and private individuals. In spite
of the fact that NGOs are acknowledged as crucial to bringing about desired
policy goals under both international and domestic laws, neither international
agreements nor international implementing bodies, such as UNEP, explicitly
acknowledge and accommodate NGOs in their compliance mechanisms.
149
147. Id. at 33.
148. Oye, supra note 140, at 17.
149. The 1957 EC Treaty of Rome is one exception. Citizen complaints can be lodged with the
implementing body, the EC Commission, which is empowered to take action against any member state for
failing to comply with the EC environmental standards. Over half of the actions taken by the EC Commis-
sion have been initiated by citizen complaints, numbering some 460 in 1989. P. SAND, supra note 129,
at 31-32. Actions are taken in three steps. First, the Commission sends "letters of formal notice" to the
offending state. After giving the state an opportunity to respond, the Commission can issue a "reasoned
opinion" regarding the noncompliance. If the state fails to- respond, the matter can be referred to the
European Court of Justice. In 1988, 93 letters of formal notice, 71 reasoned opinions, and 11 cases were
referred to the Court. Id.
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While the international environmental regime has yet to incorporate NGOs
formally into the implementation mechanisms of international agreements, the
regime is beginning to struggle with that question.15o
The comparison of individual and NGO participatory rights in the human
rights and ILO regimes with United States procedural rights is inescapable.
Perhaps that is why these regimes are attractive models. As more and more
regulation occurs abroad in the form of international agreements, the more
citizens from countries such as the United States stand to lose in opportunities
to shape regulations through notice and comment, receive a response from the
agency formulating the regulations, and -- most importantly -- to challenge
regulations and noncompliance through judicial review. This scenario is more
than hypothetical. The Montreal Protocol internationalized the process of
developing United States regulations on ozone-depleting chemicals. Unlike the
1978 EPA regulations banning CFCs in aerosols, there was little opportunity
for the United States public to shape the 1988 regulations through notice and
comment 5 ' Implementation and enforcement now pose a similar challenge
as there is nothing comparable to citizen enforcement power at the international
level.
The first and primary regime to be considered is the human rights regime.
This regime provides perhaps the most salient example of how actively NGOs
can be involved in the enforcement mechanisms of international regimes. The
regime also has impressive procedures for addressing violations of regime
norms through extensive use of commissions and courts for the review of
complaints. While the human rights regime is in many ways quite different
from the Montreal Protocol, the comparison is useful because it provides a
constructive view of how international mechanisms can be put to work to
correct undesirable state behavior.
B. The Human Rights Regime
In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights (Universal Declaration).152 NGO efforts to enforce the Universal
150. At a recent meeting of the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund, the Executive Committee's
13 members debated the merits of allowing NGOs to participate in selecting countries and projects for
funding. As one anonymous NGO source put it, "it's better to have the NGOs pissing out of, rather than
into, the tent."
151. For an excellent discussion of this emerging problem, see Remarks of David A. Wirth, Assistant
Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University, before the National Association of Environmental Law
Societies Conference (Feb. 1, 1991) (on file with author).
152. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (II1), 3 U.N. GAOR Resolutions (Part
1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). In spite of the Declaration's strong normative force, it has been broadly
criticized for its underutilized monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. See Donnelly, supra note 3. For
an especially critical appraisal, see Farer, The United Nations and Human Rights: More than a Whimper




Declaration, and the thirty human rights declarations; conventions, and resolu-
tions that followed, are as important as the document itself."I Amnesty Inter-
national is well-known for its work to bring human rights practices to the atten-
tion of the global community, but there are literally thousands of groups and
individuals who have used the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the
regime's commissions and courts to define acceptable human rights practic-
es." They also conduct fact-finding missions, publish reports,"55 issue an-
nual reports on the state of human rights around the world, 6 and work
closely with international organizations to strengthen these institutions. "
1. Monitoring Under the United Nations Regime
The Universal Declaration grew out of the United Nations Charter's
mandate and set a standard of achievement for all nations. As Judge Buer-
genthal of the Inter-American Court observes, countries that voted for the
Declaration believing there was little risk of legal obligation were to be
153. For an excellent description of the work of NGOs in the human rights regime, see Weissbrodt,
The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Implementation of Hunan Rights, 12 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 293 (1977). For example, NGOs have consultative status with such intergovernmental bodies
as the U.N. Economic and Social Council, the International Labor Organization, the Council of Europe,
and the Organization of American States. Even though they represent individuals, not governments, they
operate as quasi-governments with international secretariats representing the interests of the citizens of a
paricular state. For an evaluation of the most prominent NGOs, see L. LiVEzEY, NoN-GOvERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IDEAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1988).
154. Weissbrodt, supra note 153, at 296 n.23. Over 15 years ago, there were over 600 NGOs with
accredited relationships with the U.N. Economic and Social Council alone. In addition, there were over
400 registered with the Office of Public Information at the United Nations as a result of their status with
other U.N. bodies or specialized agencies. NGOs have more freedom to criticize governments and to use
the political process and media to bring attention to their work. Weissbrodt categorizes their work in terms
of contributions to international investigative procedures, diplomatic interventions and missions, public
discussion of human rights violations, humanitarian aid, and work at the local level. Id. at 302-19.
155. For a description of the fact-finding undertaken by NGOs, see generally H. THOOLEN & B.
VERSTAPPEN, HUMAN RIGHTS MISSIONS: A STUDY OF THE FACT-FINDING PRACTICE OF NoN-GOVERN-
MENTAL ORGmZATIONS (1986). Appendix III lists reports of 187 fact-finding missions conducted by
Amnesty International, International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Americas Watch, International
Federation of Human Rights, International Commission of Jurists, International League for Human Rights,
Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, and human rights projects associated with churches
and social justice organizations. Id. at app., at 157.
156. Amnesty International, for example, reported on human rights developments in over 140
countries. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1990). See also AMERIcAs
WATCH, ANNUAL REPORT (1990).
157. For example, Amnesty International reports that: it urged the General Assembly of the United
Nations to adopt the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
on the death penalty; it worked with a subcommission of the U.N. Human Rights Commission on language
regarding "disappearances;" it testified before a U.N. subcommission in favor of a resolution regarding
the human rights situation in the People's Republic of China; it worked to encourage countries to ratify
international and regional human rights instruments; it provided the Commission on Human Rights with
information about human rights abuses in Iraq and numerous other countries; and it continued to work with
the regional organizations and human rights commissions in Latin America, Europe, and Africa. See
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 156, at 17-18.
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surprised by the force of its ideas. 5 ' Of the two major United Nations hu-
man rights covenants that followed the Declaration, the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights has the more extensive monitoring and enforcement mecha-
nism. 159 This Covenant requires member countries, comprising about half of
the United Nations membership, to submit reports on measures adopted to
comply with the Covenant."6 These reports are sent to a Human Rights
Committee, established by the Covenant and made up of independent experts,
which reviews the reports and summons each state submitting a report before
the Committee for a hearing.' Although the Committee takes a narrow view
of its powers to evaluate or comment on the reports, it has worked closely with
NGOs to determine its line of questioning, 62 and individual members of the
Committee often use information obtained from NGOs to formulate penetrating
questions.
163
The Optional Protocol, adopted at the same time as the Covenants, permits
individuals to submit petitions regarding violations directly to the Human
Rights Committee."I When a petition is submitted, the Committee must
make a substantive compliance determination, but the decision is neither
binding nor appealable. There are no oral hearings and many of the petitions
receive only a cursory review. The Committee's jurisdiction is limited. It can
158. Buergenthal, InternationalHunian RightsLaw and Institutions:Accomplishments and Prospects,
63 WASH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1988). Buergenthal lists the release of dissidents in the Soviet Union and the defeat
of Marcos, Duvalier, and many military regimes in Latin America as evidence of a climate less tolerant
of governments that violate human rights. Id. at 18-19.
159. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976). The second covenant is the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976).
160. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 159, art. 40, para. 1. By 1987,
the Covenant was ratified by 86 states. UNITED NATIONs, HUMAN RIGHTS: STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS (1987). By mid-1982, 55 reports had been submitted to the Committee on Human Rights
and 40 had been considered. Quite a few reports, required a year after ratification, were submitted late.
Instead of encouraging states to be more forthcoming, the Committee adopted a five-year reporting cycle.
D. HARRIs, CAsES AND MATERIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 549 (3d ed. 1983).
161. Donnelly, supra note 3, at 609-10. Two weaknesses have been identified with this procedure.
First, the Committee takes only reports from countries that are parties to the Covenant. Second, the reports
of the Human Rights Committee are often unpenetrating and do not make formal evaluations of party
compliance or violations of the Covenant. However, the procedure of public questioning has, according
to Donnelly, resulted in some behavioral changes by states charged with human rights violations. "Feedback
loops" develop between international obligations and domestic practices which reinforce regime norms of
behavior. Id. at 610-11.
162. Fischer, International Reporting Procedures, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIOHTS
PRACTICE 180 (H. Hannum ed. 1984) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE]. The Human Rights
Committee apparently receives so much material from governments that it welcomes the input of NGOs
as preliminary organizers and evaluators of the material. Fischer cites the U.N. Bulletin of Human Rights,
which reports that NGOs meet with staff of the Committee prior to its sessions "in order to identify those
matters it would seem most helpful to discuss with the reporting state." Id.
163. Donnelly, supra note 3, at 610.
164. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for




consider petitions against only the approximately forty-five countries that are
parties to the Protocol, 65 and it cannot consider anonymous petitions, if
domestic remedies have not been exhausted, or if the matter is under consider-
ation in another international forum. 66 The Committee's authority to repri-
mand a state is limited to forwarding its views to the state concerned and to
the petitioning individual. 67 Given the risks to the petitioner and the limited
potential for redress, it is not surprising that the Human Rights Committee has
considered on average only twenty to twenty-five petitions a year.168 Despite
its limitations, about half of the petitions received were considered admissible
and, in the majority of those cases, the Committee found a breach of the
Covenant. 1
69
The Commission on Human Rights, established under the United Nations
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and strengthened by a 1970
ECOSOC resolution, has the greatest potential for monitoring human rights
violations. 7 ' Prior to 1970, the thousands of petitions received every year
alleging violations were simply filed without review by the Commission.'
The resolution expanded the Commission's authority to receive complaints,
directing the Commission to investigate complaints from NGOs or individuals
that appear to reveal a "consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested human
rights violations" in any state."7 The resolution also authorized the Commis-
sion to appoint a committee to conduct fact-finding within the state being
investigated. While no such fact-finding has been undertaken, regime norms
are promoted simply by raising the specter of investigations.1
165. Id. at art. 1.
166. Optional Protocol, supra note 164, arts. 3, 5, para. 2. The Human Rights Committee has held
that the bar against submitting the same matter before more than one international procedure for investiga-
tion under article 5, paragraph 2(a) did not apply to the Committee because it is charged with finding
patterns of human rights abuses, as well as making determinations in individual cases. See Van Boven,
Protection of Human Rights Through the United Nations Sstem, in HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note
162, at 51.
167. Optional Protocol, supra note 164, art. 5, para. 4. Perhaps the most effective part of the
petitioning procedure is that the state must respond to the alleged allegations within six months of being
alerted to the petition by the Committee. Id. at art. 4.
168. A. ROBERTSON & J. MERRILIS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WoRLD 58 (1989). For additional
information on petitions, see Donnelly, supra note 3, at 611. See also D. HARRIS, supra note 160, at 552.
169. A ROBERTSON & J. MERRnIS, supra note 168, at 66.
170. The Commission on Human Rights has been criticized for its inertia. At its first meeting, the
Commission determined that it had no power to consider petitions. Farer termed this a "self-inflicted
wound" further compounded by ECOSOC limits placed on the Committee's review of the details of petitions
submitted. Farer, supra note 152, at 555.
171. D. HARIS, supra note 162, at 533. The Committee heard only petitions brought by states. In
certain cases, the Committee has appointed a Working Group to investigate charges and then to report back
to the Commission. The Commission used this procedure to investigate Israel's conduct in the occupied
territories, apartheid practices in South Africa and Namibia, and the control of opposition in Chile. Id.
172. Id.
173. Donnelly, supra note 3, at 614, 616.
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Although the resolution cleared away a number of the drawbacks in the
authority of the Commission on Human Rights, serious problems remain. The
Commission's members are state representatives, not independent experts, and,
as a result, their work has been politicized.174 The Commission members also
appear to be remarkably isolated from their work."75 Working Groups estab-
lished by the Commission must examine petitions in private and only occasion-
ally refer summaries of petitions to the Commission. This screening procedure
has inhibited the Commission from adopting a more activist role in uncovering
human rights abuses. 76 In 1978, the chairman of the Commission began
announcing the identity of countries that were the subject of consideration, but
the proceedings have remained secret. 7 As a result, individuals increasingly
look to the Covenant's Human Rights Committee and the regional regimes in
Europe and Latin America as more responsive venues for redress of individual
grievances. 1
78
2. Monitoring Under the European and Inter-American Regimes
In 1948, shortly after the Universal Declaration was adopted, Europe
fashioned a sister convention, the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention). 9 At the
same time, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted its American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 8' which was followed in 1969
by the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention).'
Most recently, the Organization of African Unity has embraced a regional
human rights regime modelled on the European and Inter-American re-
gimes. 182
The European Convention is enforced by means of state and individual
applications made to the European Commission on Human Rights in Stras-
bourg. The Commission's members are independent experts, usually lawyers,
174. D. HARRIS, supra note 162, at 533.
175. Farer, supra note 152, at 572. Farer ascribes the Commission on Human Right's reluctance to
aggressively fulfill their mandate to ECOSOC's determination that the Commission should not even see
the original text of specific complaints.
176. Id. at 555.
177. A. ROBERTSON & J. MERRHiLs, supra note 168, at 75.
178. D. HARRIS, supra note 162, at 534.
179. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature Nov. 4, 1960, Eur. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
[hereinafter European Convention].
180. American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.
L.N/II.23/doc. 21/rev. 6 (1948).
181. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
182. Gittleman, The African Commission on Human and Peoples'Rights: Prospects and Procedures,
in HUMAN RIGrTs PRACTICE, supra note 162, at 156.
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from each member state. The primary work of the Commission is to screen
the applications for admissability. The Commission's decisions are published,
as are its opinions regarding breaches of the Convention." s Decisions to
deny applications are appealable to the European Court on Human Rights.'
The fact that few states have submitted applications parallels the experience
of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and Human Rights Commis-
sion. The vast majority of the applications to the Commission are from individ-
uals. While only eleven interstate applications have been submitted, individual
petitioners have submitted over 12,000 claims.1"5
Individuals, NGOs, or groups of individual petitioners can submit applica-
tions against states that have accepted the right of individual petition." The
European Commission on Human Rights then conducts fact-finding and, if
necessary, visits to the state charged with violations.I"7 If the Commission
is unable to secure an acceptable compromise between the parties, it forwards
a report to the Ministers of the Council of Europe to consider the case for
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.' 88 Again, the defendant state
must either have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court or have agreed to it in
the particular case. l8 9 The decisions of the Court are considered final,'"
and are binding under an article of the European Convention that instructs
member states to abide by the decisions of the Court. 9 '
The application process appears to be moderately effective. The European
Commission on Human Rights deems the vast majority of the petitions inad-
missable - out of the 12,000 petitions that have been submitted, only 500 (or
four percent) have been admitted.' 92 However, petitioners have direct access
to the Commission, 93 as complaints need not be espoused by the petitioner's
183. Boyle, Practice and Procedure on Individual Applications Under the European Convention on
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 162, at 135.
184. Id.
185. A. ROBERTSON & J. MERRILTS, supra note 168, at 110.
186. European Convention, supra note 179, art. 25.
187. Id. at art. 28.
188. Id. at art. 31.
189. Id. at art. 46.
190. Id. at art. 52.
191. Id. at art. 53. Although the European Court of Human Rights cannot instruct a state on how
to change a national law that violates the European Convention, it can suggest what practice would conform
with the Convention. See The Marckk Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
192. M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (1988). The limitations on
admissability are similar to those under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. The petitioner must exhaust domestic legal remedies
(European Convention, supra note 179, art. 26), must have applied within six months of the date of the
final domestic decision (id. at art. 26), and must make his or her identity known (id. at art. 27, para. 1(a)).
Additionally, the matter cannot be before another international body for decision (id. at art. 27, para. 1(b))
and, if it is an abuse of the right of petition, ill-founded, or incompatible with the provisions of the
European Convention, it can be dismissed (id. at art. 7, para. 2).
193. The European Commission on Human Rights has addressed the question of exhaustion of state
remedies in individual cases. In Donnelly v. United Kingdom, the Commission held that if a violation were
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state.194 Additionally, the cases that are decided by the Commission or by
the European Court of Human Rights often influence state practice with regard
to similarly situated individuals.195 Similar to the Optional Protocol of the
U.N. Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the European regime allows
states to submit voluntarily to petitions by individuals.196 All twenty-one
member states of the European Convention have agreed to this procedure,
which makes it theoretically available to over 300 million people.197
After the European regime, the Inter-American regime is the most devel-
oped regional human rights regime. In 1960, the OAS established the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission) to
enforce the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American
Declaration). In 1969, the OAS elaborated upon the American Declaration and
strengthened the role of the Commission by creating the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (Inter-American Court).)98 The admissability requirements
of the Commission are similar to the European example. I"
Because all members of the American Convention are subject to individual
petitions, its legal powers are potentially greater than the European regime,
although the American regime is less well-developed. It also works more
closely with NGOs. °° For example, the Inter-American Commission has
advisory jurisdiction over complaints of human rights abuses by any state that
related to the administrative procedures of the defendant state, the petitioner need not exhaust domestic
remedies. Donnelly v. United Kingdom, 16 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. 212, 260 (1973).
194. A. ROBERTSON & J. MERRII.S, supra note 168, at 109. The authors explain that the concept
of allowing an individual to present her own claim, rather than having her state espouse it, as is the practice
in other areas of international law, was a remarkable innovation to overcome the obvious problems of an
individual's state being the perpetrator of the human rights violation.
195. As a result of the European Court of Human Right's decision in Wemhoff, West Germany
changed its law to limit detention before trial to no longer than six months. Wemhoff Case, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1968).
196. A. ROBERTSON & J. MERRILLs, supra note 168, at 109.
197. Id.
198. The Inter-American Court has jurisdiction both to consider controversial cases and to give
advisory opinions. The advisory powers of the Court permit it to interpret the American Convention and
any other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states. A member state may
request an opinion from the Court on the compatibility of any domestic law with the Convention and
international treaties. American Convention, supra note 181, art. 64.
199. A. ROBERTSON & J. MERRILLS, supra note 168, at 176. There are almost no limits to standing.
Third parties may include NGOs "legally recognized in one or more member states of the Organization."
Norris, The Individual Petition Procedure of the Inter-American Systemforthe Protection of Human Rights,
in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 162, at 112. Additionally, general and collective
petitions may be filed to consolidate cases concerning multiple victims. Id. at 112. Domestic remedies are
considered exhausted if a state exhibits a consistent pattern of interference with due process of law, does
not have an independent judiciary, or has a poor human rights record. Id. at 113. The statute of limitations
for bringing a case is relaxed if the victim has been imprisoned and has developed infirmities linked to the
imprisonment, or if his or her freedom of communication has been interfered with or life endangered. Id.
at 115.
200. See A. ROBERTSON & J. MERRILLS, supra note 168, at 191. However, as in the European Court
of Human Rights, individuals cannot submit a case to the Inter-American Court if they are dissatisfied with




is a member of the OAS,2°" and is empowered to carry out investigations in
order to compile a court record.2" The Inter-American Court can order
compliance with its decisions, including restitution and compensation, and has
begun to exercise these powers.2 3 Unfortunately, like the European Court
of Human Rights, the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court is optional, and
states can choose to accept its jurisdiction for a limited period, either on
condition of reciprocity or on an ad hoc basis.2'
3. Implications for the Montreal Protocol
The integration of a broad range of NGOs within the structure of the
human rights regime is unparalleled in other international regimes. By focusing
international norms on domestic practice, NGOs and the monitoring and
compliance mechanisms of the regime have formed a powerful partnership to
remedy poor human rights practices. The investigatory work of the NGOs,
including the review of reports submitted by countries, and the right of NGOs
and individuals to petition courts and commissions, contribute significantly to
the effectiveness of the human rights regime.
The European and Inter-American human rights regimes combine the
authority of the highly regarded experts, who sit on their commissions and
courts, with the commitment of NGOs and those individuals who have been
subjected to the human rights abuses at issue. The courts of these regimes
make legally binding decisions and, in the case of the Inter-American Court,
the decisions are often based on aggressive fact-finding. Their procedures are
among the strongest international legal mechanisms for accomplishing compli-
ance with regime norms.
The Montreal Protocol regime is similar to the human rights regime in a
number of ways. It has an active NGO and citizen network throughout member
states that is ready and able to participate in the Montreal Protocol's implemen-
tation. The Protocol also relies on state practice to fulfill its goals, thus making
state monitoring and compliance the key to its success. Finally, the parties to
the Protocol have contemplated an investigatory function within the Montreal
Protocol in adopting an interim Implementation Committee. Taking the
strengths of the human rights regime -- its incorporation of NGOs, its impartial
and highly regarded commissions and courts, and its reporting, investigations,
and other feedback mechanisms for publicizing state practice - and incorporat-
201. HANDBOOK OF EXTNG RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIoHTS, OAS Doc. OEAISer.
L/I.65/doc. 6 (1985).
202. Norris, supra note 199, at 119. See also A. ROBERTSON & J. MERRIILs, supra note 168, at
192 (comparing the investigatory functions of the U.N. Committee, European Commission, and Inter-
American Commission).
203. See A. ROBERTSON & J. MERRMILS, supra note 168, at 180, 187.
204. Id. at 192.
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ing them into the Montreal Protocol regime would be a monumental step in
strengthening not only the Protocol regime, but also the emerging environmen-
tal regime to which it belongs.
The International Labor Organization regime is similar to the human rights
regime in many ways. It has monitoring and compliance mechanisms that
closely review country compliance and incorporate public participation. It also,
in cooperation with NGOs, has conducted fact-finding missions when a coun-
try's compliance is at issue. The regime builds on the human rights regimes
in a very significant way. It has for its long history incorporated NGOs into
its very system of governance. By having those whose interests are directly
affected sit on the committees and formulate the policy of the organization,
the International Labor Organization escapes many of the pitfalls of the United
Nations Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Committee, and greatly
enhances the likelihood of successful implementation of its labor standards into
domestic policy of member states.
C. The International Labor Organization
In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles established the International Labor
Organization (ILO) as part of the League of Nations."0 5 As its first Director-
General proclaimed, the ILO was to get countries to "speak. . . the same
language" on labor rights.2" The ILO became a specialized agency of the
United Nations and it has made enormous contributions to workers' rights
through its international standard setting, implementation procedures, and
technical assistance.2 7
ILO mechanisms for collecting information, issuing reports and using
publicity as a means of encouraging state compliance, are the strongest in the
United Nations system."' 8 But the ILO is unique in another essential way.
Its tripartite system of governance, in which representatives of the government,
employers, and workers sit together in plenary sessions, has long recognized
205. G. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 12-14 (1970).
206. J. MAINWARING, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION: A CANADIAN VIEw 4 (1986).
207. Swepston lists some of the ILO's most important conventions as those addressing "freedom of
association, the right to organize, collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labor, discrimination in
employment, indigenous people, minimum ages for child labor, vocational guidance and training, protection
of wages, occupational safety and health, social security, employment of women, migrant workers, and
labor administration." Swepston, Human Rights ComplaintProcedures ofthe InternationalLabor Organiza-
tion, in HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 162, at 75. The ILO adopts "conventions" and "recom-
mendations" at its annual International Labor Conference, requires countries to examine adopted conven-
tions for ratification, and supervises and criticizes those conventions countries have ratified. Recommenda-
tions are considered as legislative guidelines and are not ratified. Together, they make up the ILO's code
of standards. Id. Technical Assistance is a more recent phenomenon in the organization and is used to help
workers and governments implement the standards. Schlossberg, United States' Participation in the ILO:
Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. L. 48, 59 (1989).
208. J. JOYCE, WORLD LABOUR RIGHTS AND THEIR PROTECTION 60 (1980).
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the value of incorporating nongovernmental interests in creating an internation-
al norm for workers' rights. Each delegation consists of two governmental
representatives and one representative each for employers and workers.'
The nongovernmental representatives, as they are called, have voting power
equal to that of the government representatives, sit on the committees and
commissions that review compliance,21° and have full access to the informa-
tion generated by member countries.2 11
1. The Mutual Supervision Mechanism
The ILO is well-known for its system of standard setting and mutual
supervision, in which labor standards are regularly and systematically moni-
tored. Through its legislative body, the International Labor Conference, the
ILO has adopted approximately 300 conventions and recommendations, which
have become an international code of standards for workers rights. Members
are required to submit regular reports on the status of these standards within
their countries."1 In a practice that is highly unusual in international gover-
nance, the nongovernmental delegates are invited to comment on any assertions
of compliance with which they disagree.213
As the number of standards grew, greater and greater numbers of reports
were submitted. In order to continue to monitor implementation effectively,
the International Labor Conference created two supervisory bodies, the Com-
mittee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,
comprised of independent specialists in labor law, and a tripartite Conference
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.214 The
Committee of Experts conducts a preliminary review and notes any problems
with compliance by making direct requests or observations. In the case of
209. The nongovernmental representatives to be nominated are supposed to be those most representa-
tive of employers and workers respectively in their countries. ILO Constitution, art. 3, para. 5, reprinted
in G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 287.
210. See J. JOYCE, supra note 208, at 60.
211. ILO Constitution, arts. 3, 23, para. 2, reprinted in G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 287, 297.
If a state fails to nominate one of the nongovernmental representatives, the other can attend but not vote.
ILO Constitution, art. 4, para. 2, reprinted in G. Johnston, supra note 205, at 287.
212. ILO Constitution, art. 19, reprinted in G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 296. Under article 19,
countries are to report on measures adopted to give effect to the standards, even if they have not ratified
them. The reports under article 22 on implementation of ratified conventions are quite substantial and must
include administrative regulations and court opinions. W. GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION 203 (1981).
'213. ILO Constitution, art. 24, reprinted in G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 297. The ILO
Constitution explicitly recognizes the importance of NGO input on state reports. In addition to sending
reports to the Committee, countries must send copies to the nongovernmental representatives in their
delegations. ILO Constitution, art. 23, para. 2, reprinted in G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 297.
214. The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations is composed
of 19 independent experts on labor law from around the world. The Committee meets once a year to
examine reports. Swepsten, supra note 207, at 76.
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direct requests, the Committee works with a government, perhaps asking it to
submit more information or to take certain measures. These requests are sent
to the nongovernmental representatives, but are not otherwise published.21
If there is no followup by the government, the Committee will make obser-
vations that, in addition to being sent to the government, are published in its
annual report.216 This method of review has been enormously successful.217
Based on the Committee of Expert's report, the Conference Committee on
Application of Conventions and Recommendations chooses the most egregious
or persistent cases of noncompliance and calls governments before it in hear-
ings open to the public to explain the reasons for their noncompliance. 28 The
Conference Committee then issues a report and a special list of countries
failing to live up to their obligations. An extension of the special list procedure
is the special paragraph procedure, which puts countries on notice that they
may find themselves on the special list unless they take corrective action. The
Conference Committee's lists and reports are usually adopted unanimously by
the Conference and are public documents.219
Even those who are skeptical about the impartiality of the ILO give high
marks to what easily could have become a highly politicized process of
review.'° The process of review ingeniously combines the authority of ex-
perts with the pressure of public opinion. As a result, governments anxious
about being discussed in the Conference Committee's reports usually live up
to their pledges. Thus, the process has been dubbed the "conscience of the
mLo. ,,221
2. The Investigatory and Complaint Process
There are four basic procedures for bringing complaints within the 11O
regime: representations, complaints, special procedures for freedom of associa-
215. Problems are often resolved at the direct request stage. Between 1964 and 1980, the Committee
of Experts noted that in more than 1,300 cases, the governments took the steps requested of them. Id. at
77.
216. As a measure of the thoroughness of the Committee of Experts, the annual report is usually quite
long. In 1980, the report was more than 200 pages. Id.
217. Ernst Haas has said of the "observations":
[t]he Committee's persistence in demanding full implementation of ratified Conventions is extraordi-
nary. Year after year, in the case of certain recurring delinquencies, pressure continues to be exerted,
with the wording of the "observations" developing more and more pungency. This is accomplished
by maintaining a quasi-judicial stance. The conclusions of the Committee are considered by it as
proposals based on law, to be submitted to the Conference and to be acted upon by that body.
Nevertheless the pungency of the "observations" is unmistakable as the scale of terms is raised from
surprise to amazement, incredulity, disapproval, reprobation, and finally condemnation.
E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATIoN-STATE 257 (1964), quoted in W. GALENSON, supra note 212, at 204.
218. Id. at 205. See also J. JoYcE, supra note 208, at 60.
219. W. GALENSON, supra note 212, at 204-07.
220. W. GALENSON, supra note 212, at 204.
221. G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 101.
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tion violations, and special surveys on discrimination in employment. 2 2
Representations are brought by workers' or employers' organizations in cases
of state noncompliance with ratified conventions, and involve minimal investi-
gation and enforcement.' The ILO Governing Body can refer a representa-
tion case for more formal investigation if it decides it should be handled as a
complaint or refer it for supervision to the Experts Committee. 4
Complaints are similar to representations, but may be brought by a state
that is a member of the convention at issue, a delegate of the ILO Conference
(including the NGO delegates), or the ILO Governing Body itself.t A Com-
mission of Inquiry, comprised of three independent persons, may be established
to consider complaints on an ad hoc basis. 6 These commissions operate
quasi-judicially and can conduct evidentiary hearings and site visits to gather
information. 7 A state may appeal to the ICJ if it does not accept the Comm-
ission's recommendation. The appeal procedure has never been invoked, which
reflects the high degree of resolution that is achieved through less formal
procedures. 8 As testimony to the success of the mutual supervision mecha-
nisms as a means of ensuring party compliance, only ten representations have
been investigated and only four cases considered by the Commissions. 9
222. The fourth procedure has not been implemented yet, so it will not be discussed in this article.
223. ILO Constitution, art. 24, reprinted in G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 297. A representation
may be brought against a member state if it "has failed to secure in any respect the effective observance
within its jurisdiction of any Convention to which it is a party." Id. The Governing Body determines
whether the organization meets the definition of an organization. However, it may be a local, national,
or international organization, and it need have no direct connection to the subject of the complaint. The
ILO Governing Body then determines, based on a prima facie reading of the facts as stated, whether the
representation should be sent to the state for a response. The representation, along with the state's response
and the Governing Body's own discussion of the case, is published if the state's response is not satisfactory.
Swepston, supra note 207, at 81.
224. Swepston, supra note 207, at 82.
225. Under the complaint procedure, any member state of the ILO can file a complaint. It need not
suffer from any direct effect from the defendant state's noncompliance. Additionally, motive is not
considered important. Five states have brought such cases. Delegates bring complaints more frequently
than states and usually do so in groups. The Governing Body has initiated the procedure only once. Id.
at 82-83.
226. J. JoYcE, supra note 208, at 61.
227. Commissions of Inquiry set their own rules and procedures. They often summon state representa-
tives and witnesses to hearings, gather information from other governments and NGOs, and conduct on-site
visits to the countries concerned. The Commissions are considered quasi-judicial and their decisions are
communicated to the Governing Body and published in the ILO's official bulletin. The Commission's
decisions recommend changes in practice within the countries concerned. Swepston, supra note 207, at
83-84.
228. The ICJ can confirm, modify, or reverse any of the findings or recommendations of the
Commission of Inquiry. If a country fails to comply with the Commission or ICJ decisions within the time
specified, the Governing Board can recommend to the Conference any further action it believes might
encourage compliance. Id. at 84-85.
229. J. JOYCE, supra note 208, at 61.
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In 1950, the ILO initiated a system to expedite review of cases involving
violations of its conventions on freedom of association." Quick action was
needed to respond to cases of sudden violations, such as jailing trade union
activists or suppressing workers' strikes." In response, the ILO Governing
Body created special procedures for accepting and acting upon complaints. 2
The Committee on Freedom of Association receives complaints directly from
workers' and employers' organizations. It may refer exceptional cases to the
Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission." Both organizations can conduct
on-site investigations. 4 The ILO has made impressive use of the Committee
on Freedom of Association. Between 1950 and 1980, more than 1000 cases
were considered concerning a broad variety of free association claims."
3. Implications for the Montreal Protocol
The ILO is unique in its formal incorporation of nongovernmental repre-
sentatives in its governance. Its legislative Conference and Governing Body
are made up of workers' and employers' organizations as well as governments,
and its various committees draw membership from this tripartite group.
Nongovernmental representatives can review compliance reports, bring com-
plaints, sit on committees, and order investigations as committee members.
Often NGO delegates work closely with their own states through these interna-
tional mechanisms. Additionally, even NGOs who do not have representative
status can bring complaints through the representation process and the Commit-
tee on Freedom of Association.
230. The most prominent conventions are the 1948 Convention on the Freedom of Association and
the 1948 Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention. However, there is no requirement that
a state have ratified either of these conventions, since the authority to act on freedom of association
violations derives from the ILO Constitution itself. Swepston, supra note 207, at 86.
231. W. GALENSON, supra note 212, at 207.
232. ILO Constitution, arts. 26-34, reprinted in G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 297-99. The
Governing Body established four ILO committees that monitor compliance with the right to freedom of
association: 1) the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations; 2) the
International Labor Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations; 3)
the Governing Body Committee on the Freedom of Association; and 4) the Fact-Finding and Conciliation
Committee on the Freedom of Association. Schlossberg, supra note 207, at 62.
233. The FFCC can receive complaints referred to it by the Governing Body, on recommendation
from the CFA, by ECOSOC, or directly from the state suspected of having committed freedom of
association violations. A state defending itself in the CFA may choose to refer the case to the FFCC. The
Committee is activated only in extremely delicate political cases. FFCC has the dual roles of investigator
and conciliator. Its decisions have no legal force, but they can be monitored by other ILO bodies. Swepston,
supra note 207, at 89-90.
234. W. GA.ENSON, supra note 212, at 207. The Fact-Finding and Conciliation Committee has been
activated only five times. Swepston, supra note 207, at 88. The Committee on Freedom of Association,
on the other hand, has reviewed many cases. W. GALENSON, supra note 212, at 207.
235. Swepston, supra note 207, at 85. In a number of cases, workers who were imprisoned or who
had received the death sentence were released. The Committee on Freedom of Association also is credited




The ILO's system of mutual supervision and complaint procedures makes
full use of information and is investigating power to encourage states to comply
with their obligations. The process of review or mutual supervision -- requiring
reports to be submitted first to a committee made up of experts and then to a
more political committee - allows feedback that helps compel states to comply
with ILO standards. States are "punished" by being listed or having a represen-
tation against them published if they fail to comply. If this process does not
achieve compliance, NGOs, the ILO Governing Body, or any member state
may bring actions. The mere availability of recourse to complaint mechanisms
has undoubtedly strengthened the authority of the mutual supervision process.
The integration of NGOs in the ILO regime is a far cry from their nascent,
and somewhat hesitant, integration under the Montreal Protocol. Giving NGOs
a role in implementing the Protocol would be an enormously positive step in
reinforcing the restrictions in the Protocol. A governing body for the agree-
ment - similar to the ILO -- could draw from environmental and industrial
representatives as well as government officials, and committees could be
established patterned on the mutual supervision and complaint procedures of
the ILO. The process of review and listing would put a premium on compli-
ance regime for those parties most concerned about their standing among other
parties.
The final regime to be considered is the nuclear nonproliferation regime,
a regime that makes monitoring and physical inspections of nuclear material
and technology its central focus. Unlike the first two regimes considered, this
regime conducts routine physical inspections to verify compliance with its
norms.
D. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and the L4EA
For a quarter of a century, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) has been the heart of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.36 In re-
sponse to President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal, the IAEA was
created in 1957 as an autonomous organ of the United Nations. 3 7 While the
IAEA has played a significant role in promoting the commercial use of nuclear
power, its principle function today is to verify, through safeguard procedures
and on-site inspections, that nuclear facilities and radioactive materials are used
for peaceful purposes and not diverted to weapons production.
236. L. SCHEINMAN, THE NONPROLIFERATION ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (1985) [hereinafter L. SCHEINMAN, NONPROLIFRATION]. The author
describes the nonproliferation regime as a "loose collection of predispositions, understandings, bilateral
agreements, voluntary commitments, and treaties featuring formal pledges not to acquire nuclear weapons
or explosives that are verified by international inspection." Id. at 6.
237. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Act, July 29, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 1095, 276 U.N.T.S.
3; amended May 22, 1961,.14 U.S.T. 135, 471 U.N.T.S. 334 [hereinafter IAEA statute].
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The inspection mechanism is the critical component of the safeguard
procedures. Between 1968 and 1982, the IAEA's staff of inspectors conducted
9,600 inspections, two-thirds of which were conducted in the last four years
of this period. 8 In 1984, over 875 installations were under IAEA safe-
guards, comprising ninety-seven percent of the nuclear plants in states without
nuclear weapons. 29
As nuclear testing by the superpowers escalated and nuclear material began
to proliferate, global concern over military use grew. By the late 1960s, the
nonnuclear countries were ready to trade their theoretical right to develop
nuclear weapons for the tangible benefits of a system of safeguards and nuclear
security. The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Tlatelolco Treaty)
and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) were formed in response to
this new attitude.2' The treaties imposed legal obligations on all member
states to submit to TAEA safeguard procedures, thereby closing a critical
loophole in the IAEA statute.24
1. The LAEA and Its Safeguard Procedures
On-site inspections are central to the safeguard procedures.242 The IAEA
statute allows the IAEA "access at all times' to all places and data" as necessary
to determine compliance and to assure that the agency's health and safety
standards are met.243 Additional authority was granted by the NPT', which
requires "that the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from
peaceful activities be promptly detected. "244 The broad reach of the language
of the statute and treaty has been narrowed by the IAEA's safeguard guide-
lines, which instruct the agency to keep inspections to the minimum necessary
and to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the
state.24 Additionally, the guidelines put inspection under considerable control
by the state. Member states are given at least twenty-four hour notice, and
238. L. SCHEINMAN, THE IAEA AND NUCLEAR WORLD ORDER 150 (1987) [hereinafter L. ScHEIMM-
AN, WORLD ORDER].
239. Id. at 149-50.
240. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T.
762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
241. Dunn, FourDecadesofNuclearNon-Proliferation:SomeLessonsfrom Wins, Losses, andDraws,
13 WAsH. Q., No. 3, at 5 (summer 1990).
242. The IAEA safeguard program at the Iraq Tammuz nuclear reactor has been the recent topic of
attention in the Persian Gulf War. When the reactor was bombed by Israel in 1981, the IAEA recovered
the uranium located on the site. Now it inspects the uranium periodically. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1991, at
A6, col. 4. The agency also confirms whether supplies of imported fuel are there during its biannual visits.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1990, at A35, col. 1.
243. IAEA Statute, supra note 237, art. XII, para. 6. Recently, the IAEA inspected Eastern European
nuclear plants and found numerous violations of its standards. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
244. L. SCHEINMAN, NONPROIFERATION, supra note 236, at 26.
245. L. SCHEINMAN, WORID ORDER, supra note 238, at 136.
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have the right to approve inspectors and to accompany them during their
inspections.'
In order to implement the safeguards, the agency must negotiate an agree-
ment with the nation where it wishes to verify compliance on a facility-by-
facility basis.247 Nonetheless, between 1961 and 1983, the agency entered
into 159 safeguard agreements with 92 states.24 One of the main features
of the agreements is its record-keeping procedure. Most of the information
collected is kept confidential. Thus, there is very little access to specific
information, making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguard
procedures. 249
2. Implications for the Montreal Protocol
In regard to the Montreal Protocol, the most relevant feature of the IAEA
is its system of inspections. In addition to the committee and commission
mechanisms of the human rights and ILO regimes, a verification committee
could be created under the Protocol to conduct routine inspections and to verify
reductions in the production and use of restricted chemicals. This committee
could also perform the investigations for compliance committees or commis-
sions. There are several other features of the LAEA that are attractive candi-
dates for inclusion in a Montreal Protocol authority. First, the IAEA's dual
purpose of monitoring and providing technical assistance could serve as a role
model for softening resistance to perceived incursions into state sovereignty.
-Thus, a verification committee under the Protocol might not only conduct
inspections, but also may provide on-site technical assistance during the
transition to substitute chemicals and processes. Second, the IAEA has for
years served as a clearinghouse for nuclear information and technology. A
verification committee under the Protocol could provide information on substi-
tutes and aid in the technical administration of the Multilateral Fund.
V. BUILDING A MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE
MONTREAL PROTOCOL
The parties to the Montreal Protocol are poised to debate a noncompliance
mechanism for the agreement in June 1991. While the noncompliance provi-
sions are not scheduled for adoption until the 1992 meeting, the parties are
246. However, parties negotiating renewal of the NPT recently agreed'to on-site random inspections
in countries suspected of diverting nuclear material and technology, but the negotiations failed over
unrelated test-ban language. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1990, at A5, col. 1.
247. L. SCHrEnMAN, WORLD ORDER, supra note 238, at 136.
248. L. ScHEINMAN, NONPROLIFERATION, supra note 236, at 27.
249. L. ScHEUNMAN, WORLD ORDER, supra note 238, at 136.
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expected to discuss progress made during the meeting of the open-ended Ad
Hoc Working Group of Legal Experts.' The interim Implementation Com-
mittee is a positive recognition that compliance mechanisms, similar to those
of the human rights and ILO regimes, might be attractive in the context of the
Protocol.2 1
The regimes described above suggest that there is more the parties can and
must do to put an effective monitoring and compliance regime in place. First,
NGOs must be involved in the compliance regime chosen. The power of the
environmentalists and industry in the ozone layer debate attests to the role of
private actors in determining global norms. After all, it is the behavior of
individuals, NGOs and industry that international law ultimately seeks to
regulate, and their participation in the enforcement of the Montreal Protocol
can play an important legitimizing role. Additionally, NGOs are purveyors of
information generated within states, and can provide indispensable political and
scientific information to inform international implementation efforts. Second,
open and routine mechanisms to review compliance can generate "peer pres-
sure" among states interested in maintaining their standing abroad. However,
the reporting and review mechanisms of the current Montreal Protocol regime,
as illustrated by the poor reporting record of states professing strong support
for the agreement, are not creating the peer pressure that the ILO system of
mutual supervision generates. Finally, verification of data and reports on party
compliance can improve the accuracy of reporting by states. As the ILO
recommendations and observations system illustrates, many problems with state
compliance can be resolved positively in the early phases of noncompliance.
Additionally, as the Inter-American Court and the ILO Committee on Freedom
of Association demonstrate, investigations can be critical in resolving later
complaints of noncompliance. Thus, these three factors -- NGO integration,
verification of compliance, and open and routine monitoring -- must form the
core of any proposal to put in place an effective compliance regime for the
Montreal Protocol. A model for this compliance regime is discussed below.
A. Incorporating NGOs into the Compliance Regime
The Montreal Protocol fails to create a positive role for NGOs. By keeping
them on the outside, the regime not only loses an opportunity to make use of
their strengths but also risks making their participation adversarial. For exam-
ple, under the agreement, NGOs and industrial representatives must notify the
UNEP Secretariat of their interest in attending meetings of the parties.5 2
250. Telephone Interview with Stephen Seidel, Stratospheric Protection Program, Office of Air and
Radiation, EPA (May 2, 1991). See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
251. London Amendments, supra note 4, annexes III & IVpassim, annex V, at 13.




They will be invited only if two-thirds of the parties assent to their participa-
tion as observers.3 This provision alone betrays an attitude toward NGOs
that is vastly different than that found in the human fights and ILO regimes.
The parties should affirm a role for NGOs in the governance and imple-
mentation of the Montreal Protocol. Thus, NGOs should be incorporated in
any governing body or committee that might set policy for the agreement.
Additionally, they should be members of committees monitoring compliance.
Finally, they should be empowered to bring complaints against states failing
to live up to their obligations.
In a manner similar to the ILO nominating process, which requires coun-
tries to nominate those nongovernmental delegates most representative of their
respective constituents,' 4 NGOs might be nominated according to their past
or potential contributions to domestic and international progress toward the
elimination of ozone-depleting chemicals. NGO and industrial interests should
have the fight to appeal directly to the UNEP Secretariat to participate on the
governing and implementing bodies of the agreement if they are not selected
by their home country or if their country is not a member of the Montreal
Protocol. The governing body of the Protocol should scrutinize party nomina-
tions that are not representative of the public or their constituents or are
selected primarily for other reasons (e.g., those who would rarely take a
position different from that of their governments).
B. The Governing Body and Annual Meeting of the Parties
The parties should adopt a governing body, comprised of developed and
developing countries, NGOs, and industrial representatives - no single catego-
ry of which should have veto power -- to formulate policy for the meeting of
the parties. This should in no way preempt parties from recommending amend-
ments under the current procedures. The governing body should have a staff
that aids in the implementation of the agreement and in coordinating any
Working Groups and meeting of the parties.
Under the Montreal Protocol, the parties are to meet on a regular ba-
sis.' Since the Protocol was adopted in 1987, the parties have met on an
annual basis, 2 6 and every meeting has been of enormous importance, even
if just to build a groundswell of support for strengthening amendments. To
create the expectation that the parties will put a high priority on reviewing the
253. Id.
254. ILO Constitution, art. 3, para. 5, reprinted in G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 287.
255. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 11.
256. The ILO meets once a year for its legislative Conference and to review reports from member
states in its Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. See supra
note 212 and accompanying text.
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compliance of the parties as well as the adequacy of the agreement, the annual
meetings should continue to serve as a forum to consider the progress of the
agreement, the adoption of amendments, and reports from committees.
C. Creation of a Monitoring and Compliance Mechanism
The human rights, ILO, and IAEA regimes make extensive use of monitor-
ing and compliance mechanisms to encourage countries to abide by their
norms. The Montreal Protocol is well-structured for similar monitoring and
compliance mechanisms. The annual reporting requirements, the trade provi-
sions, and Multilateral Fund all provide opportunities for review by committees
set up under the agreement. The parties could make the Implementation
Committee a permanent body and enhance its powers or create a number of
new committees that would report to the governing body and the meetings of
the parties.
If the parties chose to create several committees, the first committee could
conduct fact-finding investigations similar in procedure to those conducted
under the ILO Commissions on Inquiry and the Committees on Fact-finding
and Conciliation and Freedom of Association. Modelled on the IAEA, this
verification committee could consist of trained technical experts who would
carry out routine investigations and verification in member countries. The
committee's mandate could include verification of compliance and investigation
of general problems of compliance and specific instances of noncompli-
ance." In its investigations of noncompliance, the committee might work
closely with those providing technical assistance through the Multilateral
Fund. 5 9 Ultimately, the committee could be responsible for dispensing a
strategic reserve of CFCs and other restricted chemicals for essential uses in
a manner similar to the IAEA repository of nuclear materials. 260 Because
trade between member states is one of the incentives for states to join or
comply with the agreement, there should be a penalty for trading restricted
products with nonparties, a prospect that becomes increasingly complicated as
257. The IAEA works closely with states to nominate inspectors. See L. SCHEINMAN, WORLD ORDHR,
supra note 238, at 237-38, and accompanying text. This system might be attractive in the context of the
Montreal Protocol. Local technical experts might work with technical experts from developed countries
in installing technology and monitoring compliance.
258. The ILO routinely conducts factual surveys under its work on freedom of association. G.
JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 156-57.
259. The Multilateral Fund is instructed to provide technical assistance through other U.N. specialized
agencies, such as the U.N. Development Programme and UNEP, to countries receiving funds. London
Amendments, supra note 4, annex IV.
260. The IAEA was conceived as an international agency that would control all nuclear material.
However, the practice today is for IAEA to control the nuclear material it uses in joint projects with
member states and to take possession when a member country has more than what they need for peaceful
purposes. L. SCHEINMAN, NONPROLIFERATION, supra note 236, at 24-25.
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the list of chemicals and products expands. The committee could inspect cargo
shipments to verify that trade between parties and nonparty states was free of
restricted raw chemicals, products, and technologies.
A second committee could receive the reports that are required by the
Montreal Protocol and its amendments. 6 With sixty countries now members
of the agreement, there is ample technical information to evaluate the effective-
ness of national control programs. This compliance review committee might
be modelled on the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conven-
tions and Recommendations, which makes recommendations to states and
issues observations in reviewing compliance of states with ILO labor standards
in its annual report on cases of noncompliance.262
In a manner similar to the ILO review mechanism, the compliance review
committee's report could either be transmitted to the Implementation Commit-
tee, if it is made permanent, or to the governing body. The Implementation
Committee should evaluate the most egregious cases of noncompliance for
action, perhaps promulgating a list of countries similar to the LO procedure
for special listing.263 Again following the ILO model, the nongovernmental
representatives would have a role in this review; they should be included in
the evaluation of party reports and be given a forum to register any disagree-
ment with those reports. 264
A third committee should be structured to hear noncompliance complaints,
as now provided under the Montreal Protocol's interim noncompliance provi-
sion. The committee also should receive complaints from NGOs and concerned
citizens, who may know more about the compliance activities within their
states than other party states. The noncompliance committee would have the
authority to direct the verification committee to conduct on-site investigations.
The threshold for screening complaints should be kept low until the usefulness
of the procedure in encouraging compliance can be ascertained.
The recommendations of the committee could be appealed to a special
court, modelled on the European and Inter-American Courts for human rights
cases." 5 In order to encourage early resolution, parties failing to abide by
the decisions of the noncompliance committee should have their trade benefits
261. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, arts. 7, 9. The amendments to article seven require parties
to submit data annually on their production, imports, and exports and destruction of restricted chemicals.
London Amendments, supra note 4, annex II, at 10-11. The Protocol also requires parties to provide the
UNEP Secretariat every two years with a summary of actions taken to promote the use of substitute
technology and chemicals within their own countries and internationally; and to report on the costs and
benefits of control strategies. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 9.
262. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 209.
265. A judge on the Italian Supreme Court has put forward a proposal for a new "International
Environmental Court of Justice." See In the Global Public Interest, ENVTL. FORUM, Sept.-Oct. 1989, at
37.
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or funding under the Multilateral Fund revoked. In general, the trade penalties
for nonparties should apply to noncomplying parties.266
D. Placement of Experts on Compliance Committees
One of the critical features of the human rights and ILO monitoring and
compliance committees is the impartiality and expertise their members bring
to the review and recommendations functions.267 When state representatives
serve as members of such committees, as in the case of the ECOSOC Human
Rights Commission, they pursue violations far less aggressively and tend to
politicize the Committee's work. 6 It is important that the initial review of
country reports be conducted by committees of experts whose recommendations
command objective authority. As one longtime official of the ILO observed,
the impartiality of the experts is critical in creating the confidence that interna-
tional supervision will be effective.25 9
E. Full Disclosure
All three Committees recommended above, and the Implementation Com-
mittee, if it becomes permanent, should adopt full disclosure as the rule rather
than the exception. Secrecy in the IAEA regime has made evaluating the
effectiveness of its safeguard procedures difficult.27° In the human rights
regime, secrecy has lessened the pressure and therefore the incentives to
pursue violations.27 In the ILO regime, on the other hand, the compliance
committees not only work with an ethic of full disclosure, they also actively
use disclosure, or what they term publicity, as a tool to encourage parties to
comply.
Access to data is essential if nongovernmental representatives are to
evaluate meaningfully the compliance of parties. NGOs are decentralized,
which means they can monitor state programs on a daily basis more effectively
266. Some might argue that imposing this sort of compliance procedure would deter states from
participation within the regime. In the studies done of the ILO, the data showed that states "convicted*
of human rights abuses did not become more uncooperative within the regime. W. GALENsoN, supra note
212, at 233.
267. For a discussion of the independence of experts on the various human rights and ILO compliance
committees, see supra note 161 and accompanying text (U.N. Human Rights Committee), supra note 183
and accompanying text (European Commission on Human Rights), and supra note 220 and accompanying
text (ILO Committee of Experts). For problems when committees are not composed of independent experts,
see supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (U.N. Human Rights Commission).
268. The ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations and
its Committee on Freedom of Association have a tripartite membership. However, both these committees
work closely with the Committee of Experts. See supra text accompanying note 262.
269. G. JOHNSTON, supra note 205, at 102.
270. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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than UNEP or the Implementation Committee. They -would also play an
important publication role by alerting the public, other parties, and the media
to developments under the Montreal Protocol. Through the media, NGOs also
can keep the latest scientific findings in the news, which creates another
incentive for states to act and to improve compliance with the agreement.
One of the key elements in any policy of open disclosure is dissemination
of the regular reports of the parties. The 1990 London Amendments require
reports from the Implementation Committee and the Multilateral Fund's
Executive Committee, but are not very specific about the scope and content
of these reports. 2' Requiring an annual report from all committees set up
under the Montreal Protocol might elevate the importance of such reports as
sources of information for monitoring and compliancepurposes. Annual reports
should include discussions of the activities of the committees and of member
and nonmember states, and should recommend necessary actions. All reports
should be made available to the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
An effective international regime will create the opportunity and incentives
for states to act together. Creating a strong connection between domestic
practices and international obligations is central to making the Montreal
Protocol regime work. As another official of the ILO observed, the proper
criterion for assessing the value of particular international organizations or
regimes is how successfully they involve the domestic decision-making process-
es of states rather than how independent of states they have become.2' After
all, as the debate surrounding the adoption of the Protocol illustrates, national
commitment is the source of the political will underlying most strong regimes.
For this reason, an international supervisory mechanism that integrates nongov-
ernmental actors can create an essential system of accountability between
international regimes and state practice.
The regime should encourage states to work together. There are many
positive benefits of the Montreal Protocol regime. For example, states can
share technology and financing to put less harmful substitutes in place, they
can create trade benefits to reward those states that are complying, and they
can move quickly to respond to changes in the scientific assessment of the
causes and rate of ozone depletion. However, the regime must not become a
hiding place for states that would like to appear environmentally-minded, but
have no intention of living up to their obligations. The human rights, ILO, and
272. London Amendments, supra note 4, annex III, at 1; id. at annex IV, at 5.
273. J. MAINWARING, supra note 206, at 102.
Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 16:519, 1991
IAEA regimes provide persuasive examples of ways to ensure that the Protocol
accomplishes its goals through state compliance.
International environmental norms must catch up with the realities of the
global environment. Ecological disasters and growing economic interdepen-
dence - epitomized by the recent Persian Gulf war -- reminds us how small
this earth really is. Yet the Montreal Protocol, held out as the greatest accom-
plishment of the international environmental regime, is light years behind the
human rights, labor, and nuclear nonproliferation regimes in its structural
capacity to implement its obligations. Unless nations work together, by opening
up international institutions to the public and putting in place mechanisms to
create the necessary dynamic between international obligation and state prac-
tice, we risk losing nothing less than the chance to save life as we know it on
this planet.
